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Abstract
This dissertation examines the causal effects of health insurance on social welfare,
especially Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansion and state-dependent health in-
surance mandates.
In 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law and intended to extend
health coverage across the country by providing Medicaid to nearly all adults with house-
hold income at or below 138 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). This expansion
became effective on January 1, 2014. As of January 2017, 31 states and Washington D.C.
adopted the Medicaid expansion. While the main goal of the ACA is to increase the health
insurance coverage and improve the health of the population, this health insurance reform
may also have effects on a broad range of non-health outcomes. The first two chapters
of this dissertation investigate the effects of health insurance on criminal behaviors in the
United States. In first chapter, using a one period static model of criminal behavior, I argue
we should anticipate a decrease in time devoted to criminal activities in response to the
expansion, since the availability of the ACA Medicaid coverage not only has a negative in-
come effect on criminal behavior but also raises the opportunity cost of crime. This predic-
tion is particularly relevant for the ACA expansion, because it primarily affects low-income
childless adults, the population that is most likely to engage in criminal behavior. I validate
this forecast using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, estimating the expansion’s
effects on a panel dataset of state- and county-level crime rates. My findings show that the
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ACA Medicaid expansion is negatively related to burglary, motor vehicle theft, criminal
homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault. The value of this Medicaid expansion induced
reduction in crime to expansion states is almost $10 billion per year.
The second chapter, which is joint work with Scott Barkowski and Joanne Song
McLaughlin, examines the negative effect of increasing health insurance coverage rates on
arrest rates based on state-level panels of health insurance coverage and arrest data from
2000 to 2012 in the United States. To address the endogeneity of the health insurance
coverage rates with respect to arrest rates, we use plausibly exogenous variation in the pre-
dicted health insurance coverage rate by using state-level health insurance mandates and
the federal dependent coverage mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The instru-
mental variable (IV) approach estimates indicate that an increase in the health insurance
coverage rate results in a statistically significant reduction in the arrest rates of aggravated
assault, prostitution and commercialized vice, but an increase in the arrest rate for fraud.
Overall, the state and federal dependent health insurance mandates are associated with a
sizable reduction in arrest rates. Our findings suggest that the state and federal dependent
health insurance coverage mandates are effective policy instruments to increase health in-
surance coverage for young adults, and the increased health insurance coverage reduces
arrest rates.
The third chapter examines the effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid
eligibility expansion on the labor supply of low-income childless adults. In particular,
I investigate that whether this effect is different between blacks and whites. I find that
the Medicaid expansion decreased the labor force participation rate by approximately 3
percentage points for married whites and increased the labor supply of never-married blacks
by 5.4 percentage points. However, expansion does not play a large role for other groups
of blacks and whites. My finding suggests that the recent law change has different effects
on the labor supply for blacks and whites.
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Chapter 1
Effect of Health Insurance on Crime:
Evidence from the Affordable Care Act
Medicaid Expansion
1.1 Introduction
Increasing health insurance coverage and reducing crime rates are two important
policy goals in the United States. According to the 2015 Uniform Crime Reports, property
crimes (excluding arson) cost the US economy $14.3 billion and the estimated losses of
violent crimes far exceed the cost of property crimes in 2015.1 Among state prison in-
mates, 90 percent of them are uninsured and potentially qualify for Medicaid in the states
that opted to expand Medicaid eligibility under the ACA (Yocom, 2014). Moreover, the
population of low-income, childless adults is at high risk for delinquency and crime (Marr
et al., 2014). Thus, the ACA Medicaid expansion has the potential to impact crime. Since
1McCollister et al. (2010) estimated the social cost of various criminal activities, their finding suggests
that the total tangible and intangible losses of violent crimes are much higher than property crimes.
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this expansion not only significantly increased eligibility for parents and adults involved
with the criminal justice system, but also ended the historic exclusion of childless adults
from Medicaid.
Several studies estimate the indirect effect of health insurance on criminal behavior
through a variety of treatments for some population groups. For example, Morrissey et al.
(2007) found that higher enrollment in Medicaid before release from prison reduces the risk
of re-arrest and re-incarceration among individuals with a severe mental disorder. Deck et
al. (2009) indicate that Medicaid enrollees in both Oregon and Washington with higher ac-
cess to methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) services are associated with much lower
felony arrest rates than non-Medicaid counterparts. Wen et al. (2014) estimate the effect
of expanding substance use disorder (SUD) treatment on crime by using the Health Insur-
ance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) waiver expansions as instrument variable, they
suggest that increasing SUD treatment rate has a significant reduction effect on robbery,
aggravated assault and larceny-theft. However, since the health insurance coverage rate is
potentially endogenous to crime rates, there exists little reliable empirical evidence regard-
ing the direct causal effect of health insurance on criminal behaviors for the entire eligible
population, especially the ACA Medicaid expansion on crime.
In this paper, I introduce health insurance into a simple one-period static economic
model of criminal behavior to illustrate how health insurance directly affects criminal be-
havior through negative financial incentives for all eligible individuals. The economic
model predicts that the ACA Medicaid expansion will decrease the time allocated to il-
legal activities for the entire eligible population under some reasonable assumptions, since
Medicaid coverage expansion not only has a negative income effect on criminal behavior
but also increases the opportunity cost of crime. I confirm this prediction empirically by
applying a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to both state- and county-level data in
the United States.
2
My findings indicate that the ACA Medicaid expansion reduced the burglary rate
by 3.6 percent, the motor vehicle theft rate by 10 percent, the criminal homicide rate by
7.7 percent, the robbery rate by 6.1 percent, and the aggravated assault rate by 2.7 percent.
These findings are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation indicates the value of this ACA Medicaid expansion induced reduction in crime
to expansion states is almost $10 billion a year.
This study is one of the two papers on the topic of the effect of the ACA Medicaid
expansion on crime. This investigation and Vogler (2017) were performed concurrently
but independently, and both use a state-level DID approach to estimate the effect on crime
rates as a primary analysis.2 These two studies differ along essential dimensions. First, I
provide a theoretical explanation of how health insurance affects criminal behavior. Sec-
ond, I perform an analysis using only contiguous border counties in the style of Dube et
al. (2010), which addresses concerns about geographical heterogeneity. Third, in my state-
level analysis, I include one more year of data which allows me to estimate the impact of
the expansion over a more extended time period. Finally, there are several small differences
in our DID empirical approaches,Vogler (2017) includes the number of law enforcement
officers and state government expenditures in police protection and correction in his re-
gression models, which I argue are inappropriate since these variables are endogenous with
respect to crime rates (Levitt, 2002). Indeed, implementing his empirical specification on
my data, the estimate is almost the same as his (see Table 9). However, when I use my
preferred specification, which excludes these potential endogenous variables, the estimates
report a weaker crime reduction effect than the estimates from his specification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background on
ACA Medicaid expansion. Section III introduces the theoretical model of criminal behav-
2I was in the final stages of my paper draft when Vogler (2017) was posted, and his and my work were
done independently without any knowledge of the other.
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ior, Section IV discusses the data and how to construct the treatment and control groups,
Section V presents empirical strategies, Section VI describes the various robustness checks,
and Section VII reports the main results . Section VIII concludes.
1.2 Background
Medicaid is the most extensive public health insurance program in the United States
that provides free or low-cost health coverage to low-income pregnant women, parents, the
elderly, and people with disabilities. In 2010, Medicaid and the related Children’s Health
Insurance Program covered almost one-fifth of the population, over 60 million enrollees, at
a cost to state and federal governments of nearly $427 billion (Bitler and Zavodny, 2014).
Starting in 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law and intended to
extend health coverage across the country by providing Medicaid to nearly all adults with
household income at or below 138 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). Following
the 2012 Supreme Court decision, states faced a decision about whether to opt to implement
this ACA Medicaid expansion. However, there is no deadline for states to expand Medicaid
under the ACA. This expansion became effective on January 1, 2014. As of January 2017,
31 states and Washington D.C. adopted the Medicaid expansion (see Table 1).
While the main goal of the ACA is to increase the health insurance coverage and
improve the health of the population, this health insurance reform may also have effects
on a broad range of non-health outcomes, such as welfare use and labor supply, marriage,
fertility, savings, etc (Bitler and Zavodny, 2014). Most of the studies explore the ACA
Medicaid expansion effect by using a difference-in-difference (DID) regression framework
(Ghosh et al., 2017; Maclean et al., 2017; Slusky and Ginther, 2017). For instance, smoking
cessation prescription increased by 36% and total expense for these medications increased
by 28% after the ACA Medicaid expansion (Maclean et al., 2017). This expansion also
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decreased medical divorce and the prevalence of divorce among individuals between 50
and 64 reduced by 5.6% (Slusky and Ginther, 2017).3
Currently, the researches on the effect of the ACA Medicaid expansions on criminal
behaviors come from this study and that of Vogler (2017). In his paper, He finds this
expansion has a statistically significant reduction effect on annual crime rate by 3.2 percent.
1.3 Theoretical Model of Criminal Behavior
There are several reasons why the Medicaid expansions may affect criminal be-
havior. The expanding coverage for individuals involved with the criminal justice system
would decrease the risk of re-arrest and re-incarceration among criminals with mental ill-
ness issues who, when they are released from prison, will be able to get the treatment they
need to stay in a normal mental state and avoid committing crimes (Morrissey et al., 2007).
Moreover, some individuals who were eligible for Medicaid before this expansion may de-
crease time spent in criminal activities since they can work more in legitimate jobs with
less risk of being arrested than before the expansion and still gain Medicaid coverage, on
account of the Medicaid income eligibility threshold increased.
However, individuals whose legitimate income are just higher than the new Med-
icaid expansion eligibility threshold may reduce working hours in legitimate work and
increase in criminal activities to lower their legitimate income, and then become eligible
for Medicaid. Furthermore, the Medicaid expansion may cause a moral hazard problem re-
sult in a higher crime rate. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) show that individuals who are newly
eligible for health care may be more likely to engage in various risky health behaviors such
as heavy alcohol consumption, substance abuse, heavy smoking, and risky sexual behav-
3Medical divorce is a couple consider divorce due to the medical expenses of a spouse who need long-term
medical care would force the couple to run out of their assets, making another spouse destitute.
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iors because they are less likely to suffer from the potential medical expenditures. Inmate
drug reports and arrestee drug test results show that there is a positive relationship between
alcohol and substance abuse and crime (Wen et al., 2014). Among inmates convicted of
violent crimes, fifty-two percent reported being under the influence of alcohol and other
drugs at the time of the offense or reported committing the crime to finance their substance
use habit. There was thirty-nine percent among those convicted of property crimes (Miller
et al., 2006).
These explanations mainly focus on the effect of health insurance on crime for some
subgroups of the entire population, and the expected effect of ACA Medicaid expansion on
criminal behavior is ambiguous. Therefore, it is worth to develop a theoretical model to
investigate the effect of health insurance on crime for the entire population. Becker (1968)
proposes an economic framework to analyze criminal behavior rationally. Sjoquist (1973),
Ehrlich (1973, 1977), and Block and Heineke (1975) follow Becker’s economic analysis
and develop a one-period static model of criminal behavior. In this theoretical model, an
individual chooses whether or not to commit a crime based on rationally weighing the
benefits and costs of participating in legitimate works and illegal activities. Zhang (1997)
incorporates welfare programs into the criminal behavior model to explore the effect of
welfare payments on crime. In this paper, I follow the one-period static model setup and
incorporate health insurance into the model to explain how the change in health insurance
coverage directly affects crime through negative financial incentives for all eligible individ-
uals. This model predict that individuals who are eligible for the ACA Medicaid would re-
duce the time spent in criminal activities because Medicaid coverage practically eliminates
their health insurance premiums and out of pocket medical costs, which not only allows
an individual to work less to obtain the same amount of expenditure but also increases the
opportunity cost of committing crimes.4
4If an individual is imprisoned due to criminal activity, Medicaid will no longer pay for most medical care
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Consider an individual who is eligible to receive health insurance coverage. This
individual chooses how much time to devote to legitimate work and criminal activities. If
this individual chooses to commit crimes and has not been imprisoned, he receives utility
from the health insurance coverage plus utility from legitimate work wages and illegal
activities gains. If this individual is imprisoned due to criminal activity, this individual will
no longer be eligible for health insurance coverage, will only obtain minimal medical care
level in prison, and will receive a negative utility from imprisoned instead of positive utility
from health insurance coverage 4.
LetHl andHc be the hours devoted to legal and illegal activities respectively, and T
is total time available (Hl+Hc = T ). wl and wc are the wage for legal and illegal activities
and are assumed to be known and predictable (wl < wc). P (Hc) is the probability of
imprisonment (P ′(·) > 0 and P ′′(·) > 0), which is positively related to hours of illegal
activities and the marginal rate of imprisoned is constant or increasing. If an individual
succeeds in criminal activities (with probability 1− P (Hc)), this individual’s utility would
be UN = V (wlHl + wcHc) + M , where V (·) represents a risk-averse utility function
of income (V ′(·) > 0 and V ′′(·) < 0), and M is the utility of the difference between
the healthcare quality under health insurance and the healthcare quality in prison. If the
individual is imprisoned (with probability P (Hc)), the utility would be UA = V (wlHl +
wcHc) + J , where J represents negative utility of any sanctions (J < 0).
Thus, the individual’s expected utility E[u] is
E[u] = [1− P (Hc)]UN + P (Hc)UA,
UN = V (wlHl + wcHc) +M ;UA = V (wlHl + wcHc) + J,
s.t.Hl > 0, Hc > 0, and Hl +Hc = T.
(1.1)
for this individual while this individual has stayed in jail or prison as a result of the federal inmate exclusion
policy (Gates et al., 2014).
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The individual chooses Hl and Hc to maximize E(u) subject to Hl > 0, Hc > 0,
and Hl +Hc = T . Let us focus on an interior solution, and substituting Hl = T −Hc into
E[u], then
E[u] = [1− P (Hc)]{V [wl(T −Hc) + wcHc] +M}+ P (Hc){V [wl(T −Hc) + wcHc] + J}.
(1.2)
The first-order condition with respect to Hc is
Dc =
∂E[u]
∂Hc
= −P ′(Hc)UN + [1− P (Hc)]V ′(·)(wc − wl)
+ P ′(Hc)UA + P (Hc)V ′(·)(wc − wl)
= P ′(Hc)(J −M) + V ′(·)(wc − wl) = 0,
(1.3)
so
P ′(Hc)(M − J) = V ′(·)(wc − wl), (1.4)
or
P ′(Hc)
V ′(·) =
wc − wl
M − J . (1.5)
The second-order condition requires:
Dcc =
∂2E[u]
∂H2c
= P ′′(Hc)(J −M) + V ′′(·)(wc − wl)2 < 0. (1.6)
This would be satisfied if the individual is risk-averse (V ′′(·) < 0) and the marginal
rate of imprisonment is constant or increasing (P ′′(·) > 0).
Equation (4) shows that, at the optimal choice of Hc, the number of hours spent in
criminal activities, the marginal gain from devoting one additional hour to crime equals the
marginal cost from that one additional hour.
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To consider the effect of M on Hc, equation (3) defines the implicit function of Hc
in terms of M . Differentiating (3) with respect to M yields:
∂2E[u]
∂Hc∂M
= P ′′(Hc)(J −M)∂Hc
∂M
− P ′(Hc) + V ′′(·)(wc − wl)2∂Hc
∂M
= 0
= Dcc
∂Hc
∂M
− P ′(Hc) = 0,
(1.7)
so
∂Hc
∂M
=
P ′(Hc)
Dcc
< 0. (1.8)
The equation (8) says that the sign of ∂Hc
∂M
all hinges on the probability of imprisonment
toward the number of hours spent in crime and the individual’s risk preference. If the
individual is risk-averse and spends more time on criminal activities does not decrease
the marginal probability of imprisonment, an increase in health insurance coverage would
decrease the time devoted to illegal activities due to it increases the marginal cost of illegal
activities. In other words, we can expect that individuals who are newly eligible for health
insurance coverage and enrollees who have higher eligibility threshold would be less likely
to commit crimes.
The pathway for the crime reduction effect is replacing the money ordinarily spent
on health care, Medicaid coverage eliminates the insured’s health insurance premiums and
out of pocket medical expenses and is only eligible for individuals who have not been
imprisoned. It means the eligibility for Medicaid coverage not only has a negative income
effect on criminal activities but also increases the opportunity cost of crime. Therefore,
one might think that the crime reduction effect would be concentrated on burglary, motor
vehicle theft, and robbery which are likely to be motivated by the acquisition of cash.
However, larceny is typically a misdemeanor and is the least likely offense to result in
prison. It then implies that the category of crime I would least likely expect to observe a
negative effect is larceny among these crimes which can generate income. Moreover, there
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is a reason to think effects could also be observed on arson, assault, homicide and rape that
are unlikely to have a direct financial motivation. Since crimes like assault and homicide
often occur during other theft type crimes or in combination with robbery. For instance,
robbery is a crime that theft accomplished by force or the threat of physical security and
most frequently leads to victim death (criminal homicide) and injury (aggravated assault).
Additionally, armed robbery is almost always simultaneous with aggravated assault. FBI
reports that almost 60 percent of all killings in time of other forcible felonies are caused
by robbery (Zimring and Zuehl, 1986). Additionally, the variations in robbery rates are
positively correlated with the variations in the murder rate (Altbeker, 2008).
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Data Sources
The theoretical model in the preceding section forecasts that the ACA Medicaid
expansion would decrease the time allocated to illegal activities. Ideally, the effect of the
Medicaid expansion on crime should be examined by utilizing individual-level data. How-
ever, it is really hard to acquire a credible individual-level dataset on illegal activity. There-
fore, this paper follows most empirical studies of criminal behavior which used aggregate
state- and county-level data.
The crime data for this analysis come from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), but
are gathered from two different data sources. State-level crime data are directly constructed
by the UCR for year 2010-2016. However, the aggregated county-level crime data from
2010 to 2014 are obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research UCR Program Data Series (ICPSR). Since Uniform Crime Reporting Program
Data: County-Level Detailed Arrest and Offense Data are only available in 2014.
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My investigation into the crime rates and the ACA Medicaid expansion needs pre-
cise measures of both variables. For the former, I use measures of state- and county-level
crime rates (Crime Ratest and Crime Ratect) using the UCR and the ICPSR crime data.
These crime rates are all collected annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and calculated as the number of crimes reported to all police agencies per 100,000 inhabi-
tants within each given state s or county c over a calendar year t. UCR crime data provides
eight categories of crime. However, the FBI does not publish arson data due to it did not
receive data from many states. Moreover, the definition of rape was revised by the FBI in
2013. Thus, I use only six of eight crime categories: aggravated assault, criminal homicide,
robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. The first three crime categories
constitute violent crime, while property crime is composed of the latter three.
For the Medicaid expansion data, the information on the status of state action on
the ACA Medicaid expansion decision is compiled by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Founda-
tion’s State Health Facts, a non-profit organization that collects a vast array of health policy
information. The states’ decisions about adopting the Medicaid expansion are expressed by
a dummy variable MedicaidDummyst which equals one if state s adopted the Medicaid
expansion in and after year t, and equals zero otherwise.
I use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) to generate state- and
county-level covariates data. ACS is a nationwide ongoing survey administered by the U.S.
Census Bureau providing detailed information about population and housing characteris-
tics. These control variables include demographic characteristics, economic conditions,
and state government expenditures. Demographic characteristics consist of age distribu-
tion and racial proportion of the population,5 which are (1) between the ages of 20 and
34,6 (2) White, (3) Black, (4) Native, and (5) Asian. Economic conditions are measured
5Both are measured as the percentage of the population in state s
6age2034 represents the percent of state s or county c population between the ages 20-34, young adults
aged between 20 and 34 are more likely to participate in crimes (Wen et al., 2014).
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as the state’s or county’s (6) Gini Index,7 (7) per capita income,8 (8) poverty rate,9 and (9)
unemployment rate.10
In addition, I include contemporaneous and one year lagged of state government
spending in a few key aspects to account for the government investment that may relate to
crime and the Medicaid expansion. These state government expenditures are measured as
the dollar per capita spending on: (10) hospitals and health, (11) public welfare, and (12)
education. The state government expenditures data is derived from the U.S. Census Bureau
from the Annual Survey of State & Local Government Finances.
1.4.2 Sample Construction
There are two distinct samples have been used in my analysis: a state sample and
a border county sample. The state sample is composed of the full set of all 50 states
and Washington D.C. for the years 2010 through 2016. Since there might be some geo-
graphic conditions that affect crime, to account for geographic heterogeneity, I use the bor-
der county sample which consists of all contiguous border counties that share a common
state border between Medicaid expanded states and Medicaid unexpanded states (Dube et
al., 2010).
There are 1,184 of 3,233 total counties located along a state boundary in the U.S.
mainland and 567 of 1,184 border counties located along a common state boundary be-
7The Gini index is a measure of income inequality in each state and county. Ehrlich (1973) claims that
income inequality is a good approximation for the wage from legitimate work (wl). A lower income inequality
implies a better legitimate work opportunity. Therefore, a decrease in income inequality would reduce the
crime rate.
8Per capita income measures the potential returns from illegal activity (wc). A decline in income would
result in fewer crimes which the purpose of crime is predominantly monetary. However, a lower income may
make criminals more likely to commit crimes (income effect). Therefore, the net effect of per capita income
on crime is uncertain (Zhang, 1997).
9Poverty rate measures the percent of the state or county population whose family income lower than
federal poverty level (FPL) based on household income, household size, and household composition.
10Unemployment rate is measured as the number of unemployed individuals as a percent of the total labor
force (aged 16 and above).
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tween Medicaid expanded states and Medicaid unexpanded states based on the states’ Med-
icaid expansion decision in 2014. Then I have full (five years) set of crime data for all those
border counties. Therefore, the total number of observations for contiguous border counties
with the balanced panel is 2,835.
Table 2 provides means and standard deviations of the dependent variable and co-
variates for the state sample, including separately for the expanded and unexpanded states.
According to Table 2, the average crime rates in expanded states are relatively larger in
property crime categories and slightly smaller in violent crime categories. However, the
covariates are quite similar between expanded and unexpanded states. Summary statistics
for the border county sample are reported in Table 3. Almost all average crime rates in
expanded states are slightly higher than in unexpanded states, but the differences in all
variables between them are much smaller in the border county sample.
1.5 Methodology
1.5.1 Main Empirical Specification
In my main empirical specification, I estimate the effect of health insurance on
crime rates by comparing the average change in reported crime rate for expanded states,
compared to the average change for unexpanded states before and after the quasi-experimental
ACA Medicaid expansion policy implementation. Therefore, the difference-in-difference
(DID) specification is given by:
ln(Crime rate)st = β0 + β1MedicaidDummyst +Xstλ+ Zstδ + ρs + τt + st, (1.9)
where s indexes state, and t indexes year. The dependent variable ln(CrimeRate)st
represents the natural logarithm of the number of crimes committed per 100,000 residents
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in the state s at year t. Xst represents the vector of state-level demographic variables.11 Zst
represents the vector of state-level economic conditions.12 ρs is a set of state fixed effects,
and τt is a set of year fixed effects. I cluster the standard errors at the state-level to ac-
count for serial correlation. Regression results are weighted by Populationst for state s at
year t to estimate the effect on the average person in the population, it means I want more
populous states weighed heavier.
1.5.2 Validity of The Research Design
The validity of DID approach depends on a critical identifying assumption, which
is that crime rates would follow the same trend in treatment states (i.e., expanded state)
and control states (i.e., unexpanded state) in the absence of treatment (i.e., ACA Medi-
caid expansion). In other words, the Medicaid expansion decisions should be exogenous
to the crime rates. Many studies examine the factors influencing state decision to support
or oppose ACA Medicaid expansion and reveal that the partisanship of governors and the
composition of the legislature have the most explanatory power (Barrilleaux and Rainey,
2014; Hertel-Fernandez et al., 2016; Henley, 2016). Unlike DID approach which the es-
timated crime reduction effect is constant over time after the ACA Medicaid expansion,
event study model can flexibly trace changes in crime rates before and after the expansion
every year. To test the plausibility of this parallel trends assumption in my paper, I utilize
11Demographic variables include Age2034st, whitest, blackst, nativest, and Asianst. Age2034st mea-
sures the ratio of state s population between the ages 20-34 at year t. whitest, blackst, nativest, andAsianst
are the population as a percentage of state s population for each race at year t, separately.
12Economic conditions consist of PCIncomest, Ginist, Povertyst, Unemploymentst,
ln(Health Care)st, ln(Health Care)st−1, ln(Welfare)st, ln(Welfare)st−1, ln(Education)st,
and ln(Education)st−1. PCIncomest is per capita income for state s at year t. Ginist is Gini index for
state s at year t. Povertyst is the poverty rate of population for state s at year t. Unemploymentst is
the Unemployment rate for state s at year t. ln(Health Care)st, ln(Health Care)st−1, ln(Welfare)st,
ln(Welfare)st−1, ln(Education)st, and ln(Education)st−1 are the natural logarithm of contemporaneous
and one year lagged state government expenditure on Health care, Welfare program, and Education in the
state s at year t.
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an event study model that allows a complete set of interactions of the expanded states with
years, with 2013 being the base year (Autor, 2003):
ln(Crime rate)st = α0 + α1(Treatments ∗ I2010t) + α2(Treatments ∗ I2011t)
+ α3(Treatments ∗ I2012t) + α4(Treatments ∗ I2014t)
+ α5(Treatments ∗ I2015t) + α6(Treatments ∗ I2016t)
+Xstλ+ Zstδ + ρs + τt + st,
(1.10)
where I2010t, I2011t, I2012t, I2014t, I2015t, and I2016t are dummy indicators
for whether year t is 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2016, separately. Treatments
are dummy indicators for whether state s is expanded. The null hypothesis for the validity
test is the coefficients on the interactions between Treatments and year dummies in years
before ACA Medicaid expansion are jointly equal to zero.
1.6 Robustness Checks
1.6.1 Some Variants of Main Specification
I provide a number of variants of my preferred specification to check the robustness.
First robustness check excludes several states that already had comprehensive Medicaid
coverage for both parents and childless adults in prior to 2014 in expanded states, and few
states that had limited Medicaid expansion before 2014 in unexpanded states.13 Secondly,
I use these contiguous border states that share a common state border between Medicaid
expanded state and Medicaid unexpanded state. Finally, I add state-specific time trend
θst and treatment-specific time trend Treatmentst separately to the main specification to
13These excluded states are Maine, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Massachusetts,
New York, and Vermont (Kaestner et al., 2017). See Table 1.
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control for the exogenous linear trends in the crime rate which are not captured by other
variables.
1.6.2 Empirical Specification Using Border County Sample
The Border county sample provides a better control group for treated counties to es-
timate the effect of health insurance eligibility expansion on crime, since the demographic
characteristics and economic conditions are more similar between two cross-state border
neighboring counties. Using the border county sample, I estimate the DID specification
similar to equation (9):
ln(Crime ratect) = β0 + β1MedicaidDummyst +Xctλ+ Zctδ + ρc + τt + ct,
(1.11)
where c indexes county. ln(Crime ratect) represents the natural logarithm of the
number of crimes per 100,000 residents in the county c at year t. Xct represents the vector
of county-level demographic variables.14 Zct represents the vector of county-level eco-
nomic conditions.15 ρc is a set of county fixed effects, and τt is a set of year fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level, and regression results are weighted
by Populationct for county c at year t.
There are two reasons I prefer to use this specification as a robustness check instead
of my main specification: First, the border county sample is just a sub-sample of the whole
population, it can not adequately represent the whole population. Second, the data time
14Demographic variables include Age2034ct, whitect, blackct, nativect, and Asianct. Age2034ct mea-
sures the ratio of county c population between the ages 20-34 at year t. whitect, blackct, nativect, and
Asianct are the population as a percentage of county c population for each race at year t, separately.
15Economic conditions consist of PCIncomect, Ginict, Povertyct, Unemploymentct,
ln(Health Care)st, ln(Health Care)st−1, ln(Welfare)st, ln(Welfare)st−1, ln(Education)st,
and ln(Education)st−1. PCIncomect is per capita income for county c at year t. Ginict is Gini index for
county c at year t. Povertyct is the poverty rate of population for county c at year t. Unemploymentct is
the Unemployment rate for county c at year t.
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period for this sample is only available from 2010 to 2014, only one-year observations
after ACA Medicaid expansion might not capture the real impact of this policy.
1.7 Main Result
1.7.1 Estimates of the Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion On State-
Level Crime Rates
In this section, I begin the discussion of results with the effect of expanding health
insurance coverage on state-level crime rates by using the state sample. Table 4 reports
difference-in-difference (DID) estimates for the state sample by using each crime category
as the outcome variable in eight distinct models.16 There are two panels that show results
for property crime (top panel) and violent crime (bottom panel). Column (1) shows the
estimates without any state demographic and economic covariates, and column (2) presents
the preferred regression results from equation (9).
Estimates in the property crime category of Table 4 reveal that statistically signif-
icant crime reduction effects of the Medicaid expansion are shown in burglary and motor
vehicle theft, but not in larceny-theft and overall property crime.17 For this sample, the
ACA Medicaid expansion decreases the burglary rate by 3.6 percent in expanded states
compared with unexpanded states, or a decline of 20 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants of
the 2013 mean of the burglary crime rate in all expanded states.18 The expansion of Medi-
caid is associated with a 9.95 percent reduction in motor vehicle theft rate, or approximately
23.04 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants.
16Eight dependent variables are Property Crime rate, Burglary rate, Larceny-Theft rate, Motor Vehicle
Theft rate, Violent Crime rate, Criminal Homicide rate, Robbery rate, and Aggravated Assault rate.
17Total property crime rate consists mainly of larceny-theft.
18This reduction in burglary crime rate calculated by using the total number of burglary crime and the total
population in all expanded states in 2013 (around 555.64 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants). See Table 8.
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In the violent crime category of Table 4, the 2014 Medicaid expansion is associated
with a statistically significant crime reduction in all violent crime subcategories and over-
all violent crime. Estimates related to aggravated assault are statistically insignificant in
column (1), but significant at the 5 percent level in my preferred specification. Among the
violent crimes, Medicaid expansion decreases criminal homicide rate by 7.71 percent (0.34
offenses per 100,000 inhabitants), robbery rate by 6.14 percent (7.16 offenses per 100,000
inhabitants), and aggravated assault rate by 2.72 percent (5.88 offenses per 100,000 inhab-
itants), respectively. Moreover, there is a significant decline in overall violent crime rate
by 3.52 percent and correspond to 11.87 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants, which is mainly
driven by the decline in both robbery rate and aggravated assault rate. The effect of the
ACA Medicaid expansion on violent crime categories is reported in Figure 2.
Figure 1 and 2 show the effect of the ACA Medicaid expansion on both property
and violent crime categories from DID estimates. The solid line represents the predicted
crime rates in Medicaid expanded states, dash line represents the predicted counterfactual
crime rates in Medicaid expanded states in the absent of the expansion, dash-dot line rep-
resents the predicted crime rates in Medicaid unexpanded states, and the vertical solid line
represents the 2014 Medicaid expansion. Both figures reveal that the predicted crime rates
in all crime categories are declined in Medicaid expanded states after the expansion in
comparison with the counterfactual, which means the expansion has a negative effect on all
crime categories in expanded states from DID estimates. The DID approach compares the
average reported crime rate before the expansion with the average reported crime rate after
that in each crime category and finds a crime reduction effect of the Medicaid expansion.
Figure 3 and 4 report the time trend of difference in the predicted crime rates between ex-
panded and unexpanded states (Treatment minus control) in all crime categories. Figure 3
shows that the predicted crime rates in expanded states are rising relative to the unexpanded
states in prior to the expansion in all property crime categories, however, the differences in
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predicted crime rates show a sizeable decrease after the Medicaid expansion in all property
crimes but larceny theft. Even there is a decrease in the larceny theft in 2014, the differ-
ence in the predicted crime rate of larceny theft still keep increasing after 2014. Figure 4
indicates that the predicted crime rate gaps between are relatively constant before 2014 and
keeping decrease after the expansion in all violent crime categories. Both Figure 3 and 4
show that the Medicaid expansion has the largest crime reduction effect in 2014 and this
effect is gradually weakened in 2015 and 2016 in expanded states relative to unexpanded
states.
The significant negative effect of the Medicaid expansion on burglary, motor ve-
hicle theft, and robbery indicates that the ACA Medicaid expansion providing coverage
for uninsured adults and higher eligibility thresholds for enrollees can decrease their mo-
tivation to commit money-related crimes. And my estimates are consistently smallest for
larceny in Table 4, which corresponds to the theoretical expectation. As mentioned before,
criminal homicide and aggravated assault often happen during a robbery or in combination
with other theft type crimes. The significant negative effect on criminal homicide and ag-
gravated assault might be caused by the considerable decrease in burglary, motor vehicle
theft, and robbery.
1.7.2 Estimates of Event Study Model
As noted above, the parallel trends assumption needs to be satisfied for the validity
of difference-in-difference (DID) estimates in Table 4. To investigate the plausibility of this
assumption, I estimate the event study model and report the estimated flexible event study
coefficients in Table 5. The event study estimates are consistent with the DID regression
estimates. The estimated coefficients are relatively smaller in magnitude in pre-treatment
periods than in post-treatment periods. Only the coefficient on larceny in 2010 is negative
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and marginally statistically significant, it might be the potential reason for why the Medi-
caid expansion has no statistically significant reduction effect on larceny in DID estimates.
However, the p-value for F-tests of joint significance for pre-treatment coefficients indi-
cates that I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the pre-treatment coefficients are jointly
equal to zero. Therefore, the event study model estimates support the parallel trends as-
sumption that crime rates would follow the same trend in both expanded and unexpanded
state in absence of the Medicaid expansion, and the estimates in Table 4 can be considered
as representing the causal effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion on crime. Moreover,
the estimates also reveal that the ACA Medicaid expansion has a significant crime reduc-
tion effect for all crime categories except larceny theft and aggravated assaults in 2014,
but the negative effect of the expansions on crime rates is diminishing in 2015 and 2016.
The p-value for F-tests of joint significance for post-treatment coefficients indicates that
the post-treatment coefficients are jointly significantly different from zero in motor vehicle
theft, criminal homicide, and robbery.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 present plots of the event study estimates for property and vi-
olent crime categories separately. Both figures show how the difference in reported crime
rates between expanded and unexpanded states changed over time in the time period before
and after the ACA Medicaid expansion for all crime categories. All plots reveal that the
estimated coefficients exhibit a relatively smooth trend around zero before the Medicaid ex-
pansion became effective, which supports the DID identifying assumption. A sharp decline
in all kinds of crime rates is associated with the Medicaid expansion in 2014 in expanded
states in comparison with unexpanded states. However, the crime reduction effect of the
expansion is fading away and even stalled in the period after 2014, especially on larceny
theft and aggravated assault. One potential reason for the diminishing crime reduction ef-
fect is that the Medicaid utilization expansion causes health care services shortage for these
low-income eligible individuals. The shortage of health care services weakens the crime
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reduction effect of the Medicaid expansion.
1.7.3 Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of the state-level estimation, I estimate several modifica-
tions of my preferred specification and results are reported in Table 6. Column (1) repre-
sents the base estimates from my preferred main specification. I drop several states that
already expanded their Medicaid coverage in prior to 2014 in both expanded and unex-
panded states and report the estimates in column (2). The estimates from this restricted
sample are larger in magnitude in property crime categories and smaller in magnitude in
violent crime categories than main estimates. Moreover, the reduction in overall property
crime even becomes statistically significant at 10 percent level. However, the effect of the
Medicaid expansion on aggravated assaults is no longer significant.
Column (3) shows that the estimates generated by using the border state sample
are very similar to column (1), although the standard errors from this sample are slightly
higher. Column (4) and (5) report the regression estimates from the preferred specification
with state-specific time trend and treatment-specific time trend, respectively. The estimates
from column (4) have a higher crime reduction effect of the ACA Medicaid expansion on
all crime categories, except for the coefficient on aggravated assault is a little bit smaller
than in column (1). All regression estimated coefficients are highly statistically significant
in column (5), even with higher standard errors. Overall, the estimates from my preferred
specification broadly persist across a range of robustness checks.
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1.7.4 Estimates of the Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion On Border
Counties’ Crime Rates
Table 7 reports the estimated effect of the Medicaid expansion on border counties’
crime rates by using the border county samples for year 2010-2014. This table is organized
the same way as Table 4. In property crime estimates, the 2014 Medicaid expansion is
associated with a 3.70 percent decrease in burglary rate and a 7.48 percent decline in motor
vehicle theft rate. While the coefficient on larceny rate becomes positive, the magnitude of
this effect is really small.
In the estimates of violent crimes, the sizable crime reduction effect of the Medi-
caid expansion is only present in robbery rate by 6.69 percent, but there is no statistically
significant crime reduction effect on criminal homicide and aggravated assault. Since the
primary unit of analysis in this specification is county-year and county is the smallest ge-
ographical identified in the dataset, the reported crime rate in violent crime categories are
very low and small variation in this sample. Specifically, there is zero variation in reported
criminal homicide in many border counties between 2010 and 2014.
Overall, estimates of the effect of ACA Medicaid expansion on criminal behavior
for border counties are largely consistent with corresponding estimates generated using
the state sample. The main difference is that the estimates from this specification are less
precise than the preferred specification estimates, as the results in Table 4 present. The
reason is restricted sample of contiguous border counties decreases the identifying variation
in data (Neumark et al., 2014). Additionally, the statistically significant crime reduction
effects of the Medicaid expansion on Burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery provide
evidence that the Medicaid expansion is more likely to affect money-related crimes than
other crimes.
22
1.8 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper extends a one-period static criminal behavior model with health insur-
ance to illustrate how health insurance directly affects criminal activity for all eligible in-
dividuals. Under risk-aversion and other reasonable assumptions, the model forecasts an
adverse effect of the ACA Medicaid expansion on criminal behavior. A difference-in-
difference approach is then used and applied to both state- and county-level data in the
United States. My findings suggest that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expan-
sion enhances public safety through crime reduction. The estimates show that the ACA
Medicaid expansion decreases the rate of burglary by 3.6 percent, decreases the rate of
motor vehicle theft by 10 percent, decreases the rate of criminal homicide by 7.7 percent,
decreases the rate of robbery by 6.1 percent, and decreases the rate of aggravated assault
by 2.7 percent. These results all remain similar across a wide range of robustness checks.
To better evaluate the economic implication of the Medicaid expansion regarding
crime, I estimate the social benefit of crime reduction based on the cost to society of crime
which is calculated by McCollister et al. (2010). The cost of crime measures the per-offense
social cost of crime across all crime categories, which includes tangible costs to crime
victims and criminal justice system, the opportunity social cost if an individual chooses
to commit crimes as opposed to engage in legitimate activities, as well as the intangible
cost to crime victims, such as pain and suffering, reduction in life quality, and mental
impairment. According to McCollister et al. (2010), the total offense costs are about $8.0
billion for burglary, $5.5 billion for motor vehicle theft, $87.6 billion for criminal homicide,
$11 billion for robbery, and $51.4 billion for aggravated assault in all expanded states in
2013.19 As of January 1, 2014, the ACA Medicaid expansion yields an average crime
reduction benefit of almost $10 billion from reducing crime rates in Medicaid expanded
19All values are converted to 2017 dollars. See Table 8.
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states a year.20
In July 2017, the Senate has been starting to debate on repeal and replace the ACA
Medicaid expansion by the American Health Care Act (AHCA), which would bring to an
end the enhanced federal matching funds for the ACA Medicaid expansion and terminate
the guarantee of the federal government supporting state governments for all people insured
by this program. This paper provides new evidence about the effect of the ACA Medicaid
expansion on criminal activities. My findings suggest that a shrinkage in Medicaid cover-
age would bring back the level of crime rates and endanger public security. Policymakers
thinking about the impacts of repealing or replacing ACA Medicaid expansion should con-
sider the effects on criminal behaviors. My findings are also valuable for these unexpanded
states which are considering to expand Medicaid coverage and improve their social public
safety.
20The Medicaid expansion yields an average crime reduction benefit of $0.29 billion from burglary, $0.55
billion from motor vehicle theft, $6.75 billion from criminal homicide, $0.63 billion from robbery and $1.40
billion from aggravated assault for all expanded states.
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Table 1.1: Classification of States into Treatment and Control Groups as of January 2017
Control Groups (No Expansion After 2014)
No Prior Expansion Prior Limited Expansions for
Parents and/or Childless Adults
Alabama Maine
Florida Tennessee
Georgia Wisconsin
Idaho
Kansas
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Wyoming
Treatment Groups (Expansion After 2014)
No Prior Expansion Prior Limited Expansions for Prior Full Expansions for
Parents and/or Childless Adults Parents and Childless Adults
Alaska1 Arizona Delaware
Arkansas California Washington, D.C.
Kentucky Connecticut Massachusetts
Louisiana1 Colorado New York
Michigan1 Hawaii Vermont
Montana1 Illinois
Nevada Indiana1
New Hampshire1 Iowa
New Mexico Maryland
North Dakota Minnesota
Ohio New Jersey
Pennsylvania1 Oregon
West Virginia Rhode Island
Washington
Note: All expanded states that have adopted the Medicaid expansion in January 1, 2014 except
for the following: Michigan (4/1/2014), New Hampshire (8/15/2014), Pennsylvania (1/1/2015),
Indiana (2/1/2015), Alaska (9/1/2015), Montana (1/1/2016), and Louisiana (7/1/2016).
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of All States Sample 2010-2016
Summary Statistics All States Expanded States Unexpanded States
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Dependent Variables:
Crime Rate (per 100,000 residents)
Property Crime 2,713.37 (662.09) 2,666.87 (701.24) 2,791.69 (584.51)
Burglary 580.32 (214.14) 555.44 (197.87) 622.22 (233.89)
Larceny Theft 1,922.97 (451.25) 1,891.58 (503.07) 1,975.82 (342.26)
Motor Vehicle Theft 210.08 (104.20) 219.85 (119.02) 193.64 (70.13)
Violent Crime 338.59 (176.32) 353.71 (197.97) 313.13 (128.83)
Criminal Homicide 4.59 (2.89) 4.62 (3.33) 4.54 (1.94)
Robbery 94.42 (84.91) 106.96 (101.34) 73.32 (37.13)
Aggravated Assault 239.58 (110.36) 242.14 (115.61) 235.27 (101.17)
Covariates:
State Demographics & Economics
$ Per Capita Income ($1,000) 28.40 (4.80) 29.80 (5.19) 26.05 (2.79)
% Gini Index 45.80 (2.19) 45.94 (2.34) 45.57 (1.91)
% Age 20-34 20.42 (1.95) 20.50 (2.25) 20.30 (1.30)
% White 76.95 (13.57) 76.02 (15.01) 78.52 (10.60)
% Black 11.14 (10.90) 10.01 (10.59) 13.05 (11.18)
% Native 1.58 (2.79) 1.64 (3.05) 1.48 (2.28)
% Asian 3.82 (5.49) 4.85 (6.66) 2.09 (1.20)
% Poverty Rate 14.27 (3.13) 13.81 (3.20) 15.03 (2.87)
% Unemployment Rate 6.65 (2.11) 6.83 (2.12) 6.35 (2.07)
State Government Expenditure ($ per capita)
$ Healthcare 2,159.67 (655.64) 2,233.46 (717.22) 2,035.38 (515.26)
$ Welfare 758.82 (385.09) 879.01 (421.03) 556.40 (186.20)
$ Education 2,968.51 (602.49) 3,101.96 (585.38) 2,743.76 (564.79)
Observations 357 224 133
Source: The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), The American Community Survey (ACS), the Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation(KFF), and the U.S. Census Bureau from the Annual Survey of State & Local
Government Finances.
Notes: Crime rates are from application the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Demographic date is from
the American Community Survey (ACS). State government expenditures data is from the U.S. Census
Bureau from the Annual Survey of State & Local Government Finances.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Contiguous Border Counties Sample 2010-2014
Summary Statistics All Border Counties Expanded Counties Unexpanded Counties
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Dependent Variables:
Crime Rate (per 100,000 residents)
Property Crime 1,828.37 (1203.71) 1,834.90 (1,194.93) 1,821.94 (1,212.75)
Burglary 456.05 (360.00) 473.81 (363.81) 438.60 (355.48)
Larceny Theft 1,277.07 (856.69) 1,268.38 (839.99) 1,285.61 (872.99)
Motor Vehicle Theft 95.24 (105.34) 92.71 (105.75) 97.73 (104.91)
Violent Crime 191.65 (214.60) 192.81 (206.96) 190.51 (221.91)
Criminal Homicide 2.78 (5.55) 2.57 (4.58) 2.99 (6.34)
Robbery 30.42 (61.83) 32.29 (62.11) 28.57 (61.53)
Aggravated Assault 158.45 (175.86) 157.95 (167.64) 158.94 (183.64)
Covariates:
State Demographics & Economics
$ Per Capita Income ($1,000) 23.64 (5.90) 23.89 (5.79) 23.38 (6.00)
% Gini Index 42.97 (3.49) 43.29 (3.28) 42.66 (3.65)
% Age 20-34 17.47 (3.87) 17.34 (3.67) 17.59 (4.05)
% White 87.44 (14.82) 87.90 (14.11) 86.99 (15.47)
% Black 6.19 (12.16) 5.96 (11.07) 6.41 (13.15)
% Native 1.90 (7.59) 1.71 (7.60) 2.09 (7.58)
% Asian 0.96 (1.62) 1.03 (1.51) 0.90 (1.72)
% Poverty Rate 15.40 (6.61) 15.47 (6.37) 15.33 (6.84)
% Unemployment Rate 8.02 (3.43) 8.33 (3.36) 7.71 (3.47)
State Government Expenditure ($ per capita)
$ Healthcare 1,922.00 (429.88) 1,969.29 (486.08) 1,875.53 (360.55)
$ Welfare 721.12 (246.66) 771.13 (259.46) 671.98 (222.82)
$ Education 2,820.20 (371.57) 2938.83 (585.38) 2,703.64 (378.19)
Observations 2,835 1,405 1,430
Source: The Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research UCR Program Data Series (ICPSR),
The American Community Survey (ACS), the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation(KFF), and the U.S. Census
Bureau from the Annual Survey of State & Local Government Finances.
Notes: Crime rates are from application the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Demographic date is from the Amer-
ican Community Survey (ACS). State government expenditures data is from the U.S. Census Bureau from the
Annual Survey of State & Local Government Finances.
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Table 1.4: Estimated Effect of the Medicaid Expansion On State-Level Crime Rates: DID Result
DID Estimates
All States Sample
(1) (2)
Dependent Variables:
Natural Log of Indicated Crime Rate per 100,000 residents
Property Crime -0.0190 -0.0225
(0.018) (0.019)
Burglary -0.0390* -0.0360*
(0.023) (0.020)
Larceny Theft -0.0034 -0.0098
(0.018) (0.019)
Motor Vehicle Theft -0.1170*** -0.0995**
(0.037) (0.041)
Violent Crime -0.0398*** -0.0352***
(0.014) (0.012)
Criminal Homicide -0.103*** -0.0771**
(0.035) (0.032)
Robbery -0.0876*** -0.0614**
(0.029) (0.025)
Aggravated Assault -0.0198 -0.0272**
(0.016) (0.012)
Control Variables No Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes
#Observations 357 357
Note: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Analytic weighted
by population. This sample includes all states and Washington
D.C. for the year 2010-2016. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the state-level. Each of the reported cells correspond
to a separate DID regression.
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Table 1.5: Estimated Effect of the Medicaid Expansion On State-Level Crime Rates: Event Study Result
Dependent variable:
Natural Log of Crime
Rate per 100,000 residents
All States Sample
Property Burglary Larceny Motor Violent Homicide Robbery Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2010*Treatment -0.0259 -0.0353 -0.0275* 0.0201 -0.00750 -0.00841 -0.0333 0.00817
(0.018) (0.030) (0.015) (0.044) (0.024) (0.051) (0.030) (0.032)
2011*Treatment -0.00477 0.00549 -0.0103 0.0355 0.0143 -0.00138 0.0122 0.0200
(0.024) (0.035) (0.020) (0.049) (0.021) (0.043) (0.034) (0.025)
2012*Treatment -0.00186 0.00799 -0.00449 0.00975 0.0000685 0.0197 0.00193 0.00136
(0.014) (0.022) (0.012) (0.027) (0.014) (0.030) (0.021) (0.014)
2014*Treatment -0.0484* -0.0505* -0.0406 -0.100** -0.0542** -0.0929*** -0.0786*** -0.0397
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.026)
2015*Treatment -0.00608 -0.0203 0.00736 -0.0840* -0.0171 -0.0664 -0.0472 -0.00291
(0.014) (0.024) (0.015) (0.045) (0.017) (0.045) (0.032) (0.017)
2016*Treatment -0.00552 -0.00769 0.000873 -0.0570 0.00957 -0.0509 -0.0148 0.0125
(0.025) (0.037) (0.023) (0.066) (0.033) (0.074) (0.044) (0.037)
P value of Jointly Pre-treatment 0.1889 0.1453 0.2163 0.8414 0.5339 0.8823 0.5538 0.7685
P value of Jointly Post-treatment 0.2422 0.1623 0.2384 0.0754 0.0113 0.0201 0.0040 0.3232
Note: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-level. This sample includes all states and Washington D.C. for the year
2010-2016. Analytic weighted by population. Control variable, year fixed effect, state fixed effect are included in each regression.
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Table 1.6: Estimated Effect of the Medicaid Expansion On State-Level Crime Rates: Robustness Check Result
DID Estimates Main No Prior Expansion Border State State Trend Treatment Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variables:
Natural Log of Indicated Crime Rate per 100,000 residents
Property Crime -0.0225 -0.0374* -0.0144 -0.0435** -0.0456**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Burglary -0.0360* -0.0460** -0.0357 -0.0678*** -0.0655***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Larceny Theft -0.00975 -0.0259 0.00229 -0.0289 -0.0332*
(0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Motor Vehicle Theft -0.0995** -0.0975** -0.0880* -0.102*** -0.0932**
(0.041) (0.042) (0.050) (0.037) (0.039)
Violent Crime -0.0352*** -0.0294** -0.0392** -0.0441** -0.0519***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017)
Criminal Homicide -0.0771** -0.0560* -0.0933** -0.101*** -0.0874***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.041) (0.035) (0.031)
Robbery -0.0614** -0.0522* -0.0567* -0.0944*** -0.0922***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.019)
Aggravated Assault -0.0272** -0.0214 -0.0244 -0.0210 -0.0359*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020)
#Observations 357 301 210 357 357
Note:∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-level. This sample includes
all states and Washington D.C. for the year 2010-2016. Control variables, year fixed effect and state fixed effect are included in
each regression. Analytic weighted by population. Each of the reported cells correspond to a separate DID regression.
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Table 1.7: Estimated Effect of the Medicaid Expansion On Border Counties’ Crime Rates:
DID Result
DID Estimates
Contiguous Border Counties Main
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variables:
Natural Log of Indicated Crime Rate per 100,000 residents
Property Crime -0.0159 -0.0155 -0.0225
(0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
Burglary -0.0406 -0.0370* -0.0360*
(0.030) (0.019) (0.020)
Larceny Theft 0.0080 0.0067 -0.00975
(0.021) (0.018) (0.019)
Motor Vehicle Theft -0.0824 -0.0748* -0.0995**
(0.050) (0.042) (0.041)
Violent Crime -0.0468 -0.0474 -0.0352***
(0.037) (0.029) (0.012)
Criminal Homicide 0.0080 0.0263 -0.0771**
(0.053) (0.046) (0.032)
Robbery -0.0779** -0.0669* -0.0614***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.025)
Aggravated Assault -0.0273 -0.0339 -0.0272**
(0.037) (0.028) (0.012)
Control Variables No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
#Observations 2835 2835 357
Note: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Analytic weighted by population.
This sample includes contiguous border counties for the year 2010-2014. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-level. Year fixed effect and state fixed
effect are included in each regression. Each of the reported cells correspond to a
separate DID regression.
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Table 1.8: Estimated Social Benefit Saving From Crime Reduction By ACA Medicaid Expansion
Crime Cost Per Offence Total Offense Crime Reduction Total Estimated Cost
Aggravated Assault $121,675 422,798 2.72% $1,399,275,348.88
Burglary $7,347 1,086,067 3.60% $287,256,032.96
Criminal Homicide $10,213,002 8,574 7.71% $6,751,360,122.31
Motor Vehicle Theft $12,247 452,691 9.95% $551,638,614.36
Robbery $48,104 227,797 6.14% $672,817,938.92
Total (In Expanded States) $9,662,348,057.43
Note: Notes: All values are converted to 2017 dollars. Cost per offense is calculated by McCollister et al. (2010) in
2008 dollars and then converted to 2017 dollars. Total offense is the total crime rate for all expanded states in 2013.
Crime reduction is gathered from my main specification results.
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Table 1.9: Estimated Effect of the Medicaid Expansion On State-Level Crime Rates:
Vogler (2017)’s Main Specification Replication
DID Estimates
All States Sample
(1) (2)
Dependent Variables:
Natural Log of Indicated Crime Rate per 100,000 residents
Property Crime -0.030* -0.0264
(0.018) (0.018)
Burglary -0.043** -0.0514**
(0.021) (0.021)
Larceny Theft -0.010 -0.00903
(0.018) (0.017)
Motor Vehicle Theft -0.115*** -0.119**
(0.041) (0.046)
Violent Crime -0.058*** -0.0565***
(0.018) (0.017)
Criminal Homicide -0.116*** -0.127***
(0.039) (0.030)
Robbery -0.082*** -0.0716**
(0.028) (0.027)
Aggravated Assault -0.047*** -0.0415**
(0.018) (0.018)
#Observations 306 306
Note: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Analytic weighted by population. Column
(1) shows the estimates from Vogler (2017)’s paper, and Column (2) reports the replicated
estimate by using his specification and my dataset. This sample includes all states and
Washington D.C. for the year 2010-2015. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the state-level. The number of law enforcement officers (per 100,000 inhabitants) and state
government expenditures in police protection and correction are included. Year fixed effect
and state fixed effect are included in each regression. Each of the reported cells correspond
to a separate DID regression.
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Figure 1.1: The Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on Property Crime: DID Method
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(b) Burglary Crime in State-Level
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(c) Larceny Theft Crime in State-Level
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Figure 1.2: The Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on Violent Crime: DID Method
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(b) Criminal Homicide Crime in State-Level
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(c) Robbery Crime in State-Level
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Figure 1.3: The Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on Property Crime: Difference between Treatment and Control Groups
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(b) Burglary Crime in State-Level
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(c) Larceny Theft Crime in State-Level
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Figure 1.4: The Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on Violent Crime: Difference between Treatment and Control Groups
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Figure 1.5: The Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on Property Crime: Event Study Estimates
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Figure 1.6: The Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on Violent Crime: Event Study Estimates
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Chapter 2
Health Insurance Effects on Arrest
Rates of Young Adults
2.1 Introduction
In the U.S., young adults historically have been less likely to be covered by health
insurance than other age groups. Nearly one in three, or almost 10 million, young adults
aged 19-24 lacked health insurance coverage in 2008 (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2009). Young
adults have the lowest health insurance coverage rates because high school or college grad-
uation frequently leads to loss of dependent coverage under a parent’s health insurance
plan. Meanwhile, they have limited access to employer-sponsored coverage and subsi-
dized public health insurance. In order to address this critical concern, 33 states enacted
a dependent coverage mandate of their own, which require health insurers to increase the
eligibility age limit and permit young adults to remain on their parent’s health plan, prior
to the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Barkowski and
McLaughlin, 2018). Evidence suggests that these state-based mandates have successfully
increased the proportion of young adults with insurance coverage (Levine et al., 2011;
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Monheit et al., 2011; Depew, 2015).
In 2010, the ACA was implemented, and the federal government adopted its own
dependent health insurance mandate, which extended the age of dependency to 26 so that
young adults can be enrolled in their parents’ insurance plan. This federal mandate led
to significant increases in health insurance coverage for young adults (Cantor et al., 2012;
Sommers et al., 2012; Akosa Antwi et al., 2013).
These federal and state coverage mandates may have implications for the criminal
behavior of young adults. There are two main factors driving such a result. First, both crime
and arrest rates in the USA have been historically higher for young adults than for any
other age group (Synder et al., 2012; Uniform Crime Report, 2003). Second, 90% of state
prison inmates are uninsured and over half of them have a mental health disorder (Yocom,
2014; James et al., 2006). Thus, the health insurance mandates created disincentives for
criminal behavior by providing appropriate treatments for young patients and by increasing
the opportunity cost of committing crimes (He, 2017)1.
Many studies investigate the relationship between health insurance and crime for all
populations. Morrissey et al. (2007) use a quasi-experimental design to estimate the effect
of receiving Medicaid benefits on re-arrest rates for prison inmates with severe mental
illness, and find that having Medicaid health services was associated with a reduction in
recidivism. Wen et al. (2014) instrument for substance use disorder (SUD) treatment by
using Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) waivers and their results
suggest that HIFA-waiver expansions result in a sizable reduction in robbery, aggravated
assault and larceny theft through increasing the SUD treatment rate. Vogler (2017) and He
(2017) explore the effect of health insurance on criminal behavior, specifically the effect
of the ACA Medicaid expansion. Both find the Medicaid expansions significantly reduces
1If an individual is imprisoned due to criminal activity, Medicaid will no longer pay for most medical care
for this individual while this individual is stayed in jail or prison as a result of the federal inmate exclusion
policy (Gates et al., 2014).
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crime rates by using a difference-in-difference approach. However, there have been no
investigations into the effect of health-insurance access on young adults’ criminal behavior.
In this paper we examine the effect of increasing the health insurance coverage rate
on reducing arrest rates for young adults, aged 19-22, based on state-level panels of health
insurance coverage and arrest data from 2000 to 2012. Since the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) does not provide crime data by age, we use arrest data to approximate
the number of crimes committed by young adults in this study. However, a main empiri-
cal concern in estimating the effect is that the health insurance coverage rate is potentially
endogenous to arrest rates. To address this concern, we leverage plausibly exogenous vari-
ation in the predicted health insurance coverage rate by using state-level health insurance
mandates and the ACA dependent coverage mandate. The IV estimates show that an in-
crease in the health insurance coverage rate results in a statistically significant reduction
in arrest rates of aggravated assault,and prostitution and commercialized vice, but an in-
crease in the arrest rate of fraud. Overall, the state and federal dependent health insurance
mandates are associated with a sizable reduction in arrest rates for young adults.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical
framework and data. In section 3, I provide a detailed description of the results. Finally, I
present my concluding remarks in section 4.
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2.2 Empirical Framework and Data
2.2.1 Empirical Analysis
To estimate the effect of health insurance coverage rates on arrest rates, we first use
the following ordinary least squares (OLS) econometric model:
ArrestRatei,s,t = η0 + η1HISHRs,t +Xs,tη3 + θs + γt + us,t, (2.1)
where ArrestRatei,s,t is the arrest rate of offense i for young adults aged 19 to 22 in state
s and year t, HISHRs,t is the share of the population aged 19 to 22 in state s during year
t that is covered by health insurance, Xs,t represents a vector of state-level demographic
variables, and θs and γt represent state and year fixed-effects, respectively. The estimated
coefficient η1 shows the relationship between a state’s health insurance coverage rate and
its arrest rate.
However, OLS estimators for this model may be biased because the health insurance
coverage rate is potentially endogenous, as HISHRs,t is not independent of the error term
in Equation 1, in other words, both the arrest rate and the health insurance coverage rate
are jointly affected by potentially unobserved demographic factors.
2.2.1.1 Instrumental Variable Approach
To properly identify the causal effect of health insurance, we use a two-stage least
square (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) approach to examine the pathway effect of health
insurance coverage rates on the arrest rate. We use the federal and state dependent health
insurance coverage mandates for young adults as an instrument for health insurance cov-
erage. One option for an IV would be to use the share of young adults aged 19 to 22 who
were eligible for the health insurance mandate under the state’s law during a given year.
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An important drawback to this approach is that, if we use the features of the laws that re-
flect personal characteristics like age, student, or marital status, then the resulting share of
young adults eligible for the mandate would reflect the unobserved demographic and soci-
etal characteristics of a state in a given year. Our instrument would, therefore, potentially
suffer from a similar problem as HISHRs,t would suffer from.
We solve this problem by creating a state-by-year measure of the extent/reach of the
government health insurance mandates. This measure would not reflect the demographics
of a particular state and year, but only the scope of the state’s mandate in a year. To do this,
we adopt the “simulated instrument” introduced by Currie and Gruber (1996a,b); Cutler
and Gruber (1996) and used by Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), Ham and Shore-Sheppard
(2005), Gruber and Simon (2008), and Barkowski (2015), among others. These papers
used the stimulated instrument to adjust for endogeneity in Medicaid eligibility. We adapt
this concept to the health insurance mandates.
The instrument ELIGIVs,t is imputed as the share of population aged 19-22 of all
other states in year 2000 eligible for insurance coverage under the state s’s mandate laws
in year t. More precisely, let ∼ s indicate not state s, and fs,t(xi,g,t) reflect a function that
maps from an individual i in geography g and year t to eligibility under the laws of state s
in year t. Ig,t measures the total number of people in a geography g in a year t. This yields
the following equation:
ELIGIVs,t =
1
I∼s,t
∑
i,∼s,t
fs,t(xi,∼s,t). (2.2)
We calculate this using all individuals between the ages of 19 and 22 (inclusive). ELIGIVs,t
is an instrumental variable for HISHRs,t in our model. Hence, identification comes from
changes in the mandates, not demographics in the state.
The first-stage regression measures the relationship between health insurance man-
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dates and health insurance coverage by the equation:
HISHRs,t = α0 + α1ELIGIVs,t +Xs,tα3 + θs + γt + εs,t, (2.3)
where ELIGIVs,t, the health-insurance mandate eligibility rate, is calculated by Equation
2. The coefficient of interest is α1, which is expected to be positive since the health insur-
ance coverage rate in a state should increase as the eligible population in all other states
increases under this state’s mandates. Using the predicted values for health insurance cover-
age ĤISHRs,t from Equation 3, we estimate the causal effect of heath insurance coverage
on the arrest rate with the following second stage:
ArrestRatei,s,t = β0 + β1ĤISHRs,t +Xs,tβ3 + θs + γt + µs,t. (2.4)
The values of β1 provide the causal estimate of health insurance availability on the arrest
rate.
2.2.2 Data Sources
Our data consist of a panel of annual, state-level observations between 2000 and
2012. The data come from the American Community Survey (ACS), the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS), and the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Program Data Series (ICPSR).
2.2.2.1 Dependent variables: arrest rates
State-level arrest rates (ArrestRates,t) are collected annually by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) and reported by the ICPSR in Uniform Crime Reporting Pro-
gram Data [United States]: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race, Summarized Yearly 2000-2012,
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and are measured as the number of arrests in the population aged 19 to 22 reported to po-
lice agencies within a given state s over an entire calendar year t (ArrestRates,t: number
of arrests of young adults, aged 19 to 22, reported by the police of all law enforcement
agencies per 100,000 residents).
ICPSR state-aggregate arrest reports provide information on the number of arrests
on 43 sub-categories of offenses and the counts of arrests by age, sex, and race for each
particular offense in a given year. Our sample uses 23 categories of offenses including
criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor ve-
hicle theft, arson, other assaults (simple), forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement,
stolen property, vandalism, weapons, prostitution and commercialized vice, sex offenses,
drug abuse violations, offenses against family and children, driving under the influence,
liquor laws, disorderly conduct, and all other offenses. The first eight offenses are collec-
tively referred to as Part I offenses, while the rest are refereed to as Part II offenses. Since
Gambling, Drunkenness, Vagrancy, Suspicion, curfew, and runaways have a less than 600
observations, we drop them from the sample. There are total 10 sub-categories of drug
related offenses, but we only use the aggregate drug offense category - Total drug abuse vi-
olations. Moreover, our sample include all states and Washington D.C. except Florida since
it did not provide arrest data during our sample period, and only 35 states in our sample
provided a balanced panel arrest dataset for all listed offenses.
2.2.2.2 Instrumental variable: health insurance mandates eligibility rate
Health insurance mandates eligibility rate (ELIGIVs,t) are the share of young
adults aged 19 to 22 in all other states in the year 2000 who are eligible for the health
insurance coverage mandate under state s’s mandate in effect during a given year t. The
mandate dataset is gathered by Barkowski and McLaughlin (2018). Each state with a man-
date has a set of eligibility requirements. If we impute average eligibility rates for a state s
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in a given year t, this average would reflect the demographic features of the state s, which
might be correlated with unobserved determinants of the arrest rate in the state. We there-
fore use ACS 2000 5% population sample data for the population of all other states in the
year 2000 to calculate the average eligibility rate between the ages of 19 and 22 in state s
and year t, using the state s’s laws in year t. This measure only reflects the scope of the
law, but not the demographics of a particular state s and year t.
2.2.2.3 Pathway variables: health insurance coverage rate
The variable on the pathway from the health insurance coverage mandates to arrest
reductions is the health insurance coverage rate. We derived the state-level health insurance
coverage rates (HISHRs,t) from individual-level information on annual health insurance
coverage in the CPS dataset.
CPS data are available on health insurance coverage from 2000 to 2012. All sur-
veyed persons are requested to report whether respondents had any health insurance cover-
age during the previous year. The individual-level health insurance coverage dichotomous
indicators of young adults aged 19 to 22 are then aggregated to each state s in each year
t to calculate the state-level health insurance coverage rate (HISHRs,t: the share of the
population age 19 to 22 in state s during year t that was covered by health insurance).
2.2.2.4 Other controls
State-level covariates Xs,t includes demographic characteristics for young adults
aged 19-22 and all other age groups. Demographic characteristics for individuals between
the ages of 19 and 22 consist of the racial, gender, and poverty proportions of the popula-
tion, which were (1) White, (2) Black, (3) Asian, (4) Hispanic, (5) Male, (6) 75% poverty
level or less, (7) 100% poverty level or less, (8) 125% poverty level or less, and (9) 150%
poverty level or less. Demographic characteristics for all other age groups include (10) the
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proportion of the population who was employed, and the percentage of residents who were
(11) high-school dropouts, and (12) high-school graduates or equivalent.
2.2.3 IV Validity
2.2.3.1 Balance Tests
For the instrument to be valid, the excluded instrument can only affect the outcome
variable through the included endogenous regressor, this is called the exclusion restriction.
In our case, it means the health insurance mandate eligibility rates can affect the arrest rate
only indirectly through the health insurance coverage rate. However, the validity of the
exclusion restriction cannot be tested as the condition involves an unobservable residual.
If the health insurance mandates were randomly assigned, the health insurance mandate
eligibility rate would be unrelated to both observable and unobservable characteristics,
conditional on state and year fixed-effects. We provide a balance test to show whether
the excluded instrument is correlated with any of the observable variables.
We regress each observable characteristic on the excluded instrument and other
categories of controls individually, with state and year fixed effects using the following
model:
Observablei,s,t = ϕ0 + ϕ1ELIGIVs,t + ϕ2Others∼i,s,t + θs + γt + us,t, (2.5)
where Observablei,s,t represents observable characteristic i in state s in year t,
ELIGIVs,t is the excluded instrument variable for state s in year t, and Other∼i,s,t repre-
sents all other categories of observable characteristics (control variables), which excluded
the category of Observablei,s,t2.
2We have six categories of observable characteristics, i.e., Race, Hispanic, Gender, Poverty Levels, Ed-
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Table 3 reports the regression results for the observable demographic characteristics
of the individuals in the states. The proportion of the population who were Hispanic is
only marginally significant coefficients. The state aggregate education levels, employment
status, races, gender, and poverty levels show no significant relationship with the excluded
instrument.
2.3 Empirical Results
The results for the effect of the health insurance coverage rate on arrest rates are
reported in Table 4. The estimates with only state and year fixed effects are reported in
Columns (1) - (3); the estimates including all covariates are presented in Columns (4) - (6).
Moreover, Columns (1) and (4) show the OLS regression results from Equation 1; Columns
(2) and (5) present the IV regression estimates from Equation 4; Columns (3) and (6) report
the F-statistics for the excluded instrument from the first stage estimates (Equation 3). In
Columns (3) and (6), all F statistics are larger than 6.636 (square of 2.576), which means
all first stage coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% significance level.
In Part I offenses, we report property crime categories and violent crime categories
separately. For the property crimes, the OLS estimates show that the arrest rates of all
offenses are negatively associated with an increase in health insurance coverage except ar-
son. Only motor vehicle theft has significant coefficients in both columns. In IV regression
results, almost all the coefficients of interest become negative and statistically insignificant.
This is due to the standard deviations of each IV estimates being much higher than for OLS
estimates. However, the magnitude of coefficients is also higher than OLS, especially, for
Burglary and Larceny. For violent crime, there are no statistically significant estimates in
ucation Levels, and Employment Status. For instance, if we run a regression of percent of individuals who
were white on the excluded instrument, we will include Hispanic, Gender, Poverty Levels, Education Levels,
and Employment Status into the model.
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the OLS regression results. However, the IV estimates in both column (2) and (4) report
that the coefficient of aggravated assault is negative and statistically significant on the mar-
gin at a 10% significance level. In other words, a 1 percentage point increases in health
insurance coverage led to 8.31 fewer offenses of aggravated assault per 100,000 residents,
which is a relative 2.7 percent reduction in the aggravated assault arrest rate.
In Part II offenses, most of the coefficients are negative, but none of them are sta-
tistically significant in the OLS estimates. Once we instrument for the health insurance
coverage rate, the IV regression result show that an increase in the health insurance cov-
erage rate of 1 percentage point reduced the arrest rate of prostitution and commercialized
vice by 4.21 per 100,000 residents. Moreover, we also found a significant increase in the
arrest rate of fraud at the 5% significance level. An increase of 31.72 per 100,000 residents
was associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the health insurance coverage rate.
Translating the estimated marginal effects into percentage change, a 1 percentage point in-
creases in the health insurance coverage rate resulted in a relative 8.33 percent decrease
in the arrest rate of prostitution and commercialized vice, and a relative 12.4 percent in-
crease in the arrest rate of fraud. In general, the coefficients and standard deviations of IV
estimates are larger than OLS estimates.
Even though we present estimates and standard deviations for individual regres-
sions, our main hypothesis is not about a particular outcome, but the set of outcomes. In
particular, we want to test a null hypothesis in which the effect of health insurance on each
arrest category is jointly equal to zero against an alternative where at least one of the cate-
gories has a non-zero effect. To do this, we use a binomial sign test. In this test, the sign of
the coefficient estimate for each arrest category is observed. If the null hypothesis is true,
the expected number of negative coefficient estimates would be 11.5, but if many more or
many fewer are observed, this is evidence against the null. The binomial distribution is
used to quantify how many more or less need to be observed before rejecting the null. In
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the language of the binomial distribution, we will call a negative coefficient estimate as a
success and each regression represents a trial. In the context of the binomial distribution,
our null hypothesis would be stated as the probability of a success is equal to 0.5 for all
trials, and the alternative is that it is not 0.5 for at least one of the trials. In our analysis,
therefore, we have 23 trials (due to 23 arrest categories), and we reject the null for a 5%
significance level if we have six or fewer successes (since six is the 0.0173 quantile of
the binomial distribution) or sixteen or more successes (the 0.9827 quantile). Since the
binomial distribution is symmetric under the null hypothesis, we calculate the associated
p-value as 2 ∗ (1− F (x, 0.5, 23)), where F is the binomial CDF, and 0.5 and 23 represent
the relevant parameters. Table 4 reports the number of successes (negative estimates) and
the p-value of binomial two tail test for each specification, the estimates in all specifications
show that we have enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis at a 10% significant level.
In particular, in our main specification, we can reject the null at a 5% significant level in
which the effect of health insurance coverage on each arrest category is jointly significantly
different from zero. In other words, the estimates reveal that the increase in health insur-
ance coverage has resulted in a significant decrease in the overall arrest rates at the 10%
significance level.
2.4 Conclusion
State and federal governments have enacted dependent coverage mandates requir-
ing health insurers to extend health insurance coverage to young adults. These mandates
not only significantly increased health insurance coverage for young adults, but also held
the potential to promote public safety through a sizable reduction in the arrest rate. By
instrumenting with state-level dependent health insurance coverage mandates and the ACA
coverage mandate, we can address the potential endogeneity of the health insurance cover-
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age rate with respect to arrest rates. Our findings suggest a statistically significant negative
effect of the increasing health insurance coverage rate on overall arrest rates for young
adults.
The IV estimates show that a 1 percentage point increases in health insurance cov-
erage rates can reduce the arrest rate of aggravated assault by 2.7 percent, reduce the arrest
rate of prostitution and commercialized vice by 8.33 percent, but increase the arrest rate
of fraud by 12.4 percent. Our findings indicate that enacting state and federal dependent
health insurance coverage mandates are effective policy instruments to improve health in-
surance coverage for young adults, and a higher level of health insurance coverage rate can
reduce overall arrest rates.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Part I and II Offenses Categories
Dependent Variables Mean Standard Deviations Observations
Part I Offenses
Property Crime
Arson 9.70 6.78 636
Burglary 275.64 136.80 641
Larceny Theft 1111.84 424.76 648
Motor Vehicle Theft 99.49 80.53 648
Violent Crime
Assault 304.17 170.15 648
Criminal Homicide 15.80 10.83 636
Forcible Rape 24.15 13.61 637
Robbery 113.84 74.29 648
Part II Offenses
Disorderly Conduct 657.15 512.79 648
Driving Under The Influence 1268.28 673.35 647
Embezzlement 26.69 31.70 631
Forgery And Counterfeiting 97.83 61.61 646
Fraud 256.26 307.77 647
Liquor Laws 1746.67 1692.36 648
Offense Against Family And Children 85.56 74.38 635
Other Assaults 1072.47 478.74 648
Other Offenses 3962.79 2142.04 648
Prostitution And Commercialized Vice 50.52 133.06 631
Sex Offenses 54.75 33.73 640
Stolen Property-Buy, Receive, Poss. 115.77 83.18 642
Total Drug Abuse Violations 1793.54 762.29 648
Vandalism 278.28 149.40 648
Weapons-Carry, Posses, etc. 156.17 91.01 648
Note: This sample includes all states and Washington D.C., but Florida for the year 2000-2012.
Sample restricted to young adults ages 19 through 22 who were not disabled. All offenses mea-
sured as number of arrest per 100,000 residents in a state and a given year.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Instrumental, Pathway, and Control Variables
Mean Standard Deviations
Instrumental Variable
Health Insurance Mandates Eligibility Rate 0.351 0.426
Pathway Variable
Health Insurance Coverage Rate 0.733 0.084
Covariates for young adults aged 19-22
White 0.746 0.147
Black 0.127 0.124
Asian 0.037 0.058
Male 0.510 0.023
Hispanic 0.119 0.115
75% Poverty or less 0.186 0.044
100% Poverty or less 0.239 0.053
125% Poverty or less 0.292 0.062
150% Poverty or less 0.343 0.070
Covariates for other age groups
High school dropout 0.368 0.039
High school graduate 0.376 0.044
Employed 0.473 0.033
Note: This sample includes all states and Washington D.C., for the year 2000-2012.
Sample restricted to young adults ages 19 through 22 who were not disabled. ACS
2000 census person weights and CPS insurance weights used in calculations.
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Table 2.3: Balance Test
(1)
Dependent Variables: Mandate Eligibility Rate
Percent of individuals who were high school dropout 0.000807
(0.002)
Percent of individuals who were high school graduate -0.00242
(0.002)
Percent of individuals who were employed -0.000497
(0.003)
Percent of individuals who were white -0.0111
(0.007)
Percent of individuals who were black 0.00497
(0.004)
Percent of individuals who were Asian -0.000196
(0.002)
Percent of individuals who were Hispanic -0.00679*
(0.004)
Percent of individuals who were male -0.00343
(0.004)
Percent of individuals whose income was below 75 % poverty -0.000329
(0.007)
Percent of individuals whose income was below 100 % poverty 0.00156
(0.007)
Percent of individuals whose income was below 125 % poverty 0.00180
(0.008)
Percent of individuals whose income was below 150 % poverty 0.000442
(0.009)
Note: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. This sample includes all states and Washington
D.C. for the year 2000-2012. And sample restricted to young adults ages 19 through 22 who were not
disabled. Standard deviations in parentheses are clustered at the state-level. Year fixed effect and state
fixed effect are included. Each cell in table is a regression result.
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Table 2.4: IV Estimated Effect of the Health Insurance Coverage On Young Adults’ Arrest rates
OLS IV First Stage OLS IV First Stage
Outcome Variables:
Arrest Rate per 100,000 residents F-stat F-stat
Part I Offense
Property Crime
Arson 3.185 -3.032 8.06 3.409 0.053 8.03
(5.854) (25.112) (5.772) (25.597)
Burglary -62.72 -188.7 7.98 -52.94 -273.8 8.03
(43.608) (365.898) (47.170) (340.703)
Larceny Theft -258.5 -1761.7 7.97 -238.2 -1838.8 8.32
(170.205) (1526.128) (160.692) (1469.631)
Motor Vehicle Theft -85.06** -93.13 7.97 -87.14** -166.3 8.32
(41.196) (304.356) (39.815) (269.090)
Violent Crime
Aggravated Assault -87.33 -987.9* 7.97 -79.26 -831.2 8.32
(76.763) (548.506) (75.141) (506.356)
Criminal Homicide 3.725 20.59 7.57 4.703 26.19 7.57
(5.503) (33.481) (5.508) (31.894)
Forcible Rape 3.839 -67.23 7.97 3.399 -53.22 7.81
(7.570) (65.151) (7.207) (61.508)
Robbery -57.84 3.976 7.97 -39.28 -2.018 8.32
(43.734) (200.828) (38.220) (189.741)
Part II Offense
Disorderly Conduct -325.9 -839.7 7.97 -299.7 -433.4 8.32
(224.630) (1328.260) (214.331) (1223.330)
Driving Under The Influence -199.9 -2454.5 7.87 -304.8 -2158.2 8.17
(230.517) (1977.528) (218.843) (1683.568)
Embezzlement -11.77 -49.03 7.24 -12.00 -6.022 7.30
(12.347) (75.923) (12.669) (78.472)
Forgery And Counterfeiting 23.02 358.2 8.14 22.44 381.3 8.29
(32.427) (279.036) (30.033) (254.820)
Fraud 318.1 3139.2** 8.10 265.3 3171.5** 8.35
(198.281) (1540.464) (195.390) (1469.868)
Liquor Laws -456.9 1245.6 7.97 -397.4 2911.3 8.32
(787.922) (6192.979) (789.769) (4790.159)
Offenses Against Family And Children 7.558 46.23 8.13 22.81 -23.26 8.02
(34.550) (206.914) (28.923) (189.974)
Other Assaults -83.03 -1458.9 7.97 -147.1 -1250.9 8.32
(245.383) (1551.139) (238.236) (1443.379)
Other Offenses -1033.3 -6628.0 7.97 -941.2 -7047.2 8.32
(987.154) (7258.180) (869.103) (7262.604)
Prostitution And Commercialized Vice -28.86 -453.6** 7.98 -20.42 -421.1** 7.91
(48.360) (194.811) (40.367) (192.027)
Sex Offenses -8.499 -94.48 7.54 -4.678 -109.9 7.92
(16.394) (106.084) (15.812) (98.768)
Stolen Property-Buy, Receive, Poss. 5.398 3.815 7.33 3.764 66.35 7.73
(40.195) (362.220) (36.895) (347.805)
Total Drug Abuse Violations -669.6 -2440.2 7.97 -629.1 -1932.5 8.32
(466.989) (2476.119) (433.102) (2322.119)
Vandalism -31.84 -785.1 7.97 -31.05 -686.3 8.32
(59.293) (574.494) (56.852) (523.876)
Weapons-Carry, Posses, etc. -45.57 -351.3 7.97 -51.29 -302.9 8.32
(34.453) (299.573) (31.836) (268.215)
Number of Successes (Negative Estimates) 16* 16* 16* 17**
P-value 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.035
Control Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. This sample includes all states and Washington D.C., but Florida for the year
2000-2012. And sample restricted to young adults ages 19 through 22 who were not disabled. Standard deviations in parentheses
are clustered at the state-level. Year fixed effect and state fixed effect are included. Each cell in table is a regression result.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Medicaid Expansions on
Labor Supply of Low-Income Childless
Adults: Black-White Differentials
3.1 Introduction
The United States health insurance market is closely linked with the labor market.
For instance, the evidence shows that approximately 80% of full-time, year-round work-
ers bought health insurance through their own employment in 2010 (Barkowski, 2017).
The main reason for this is that employment-based health insurance is usually provided at
a much lower cost than coverage through other sources due to preferential tax treatment,
economies of scale for groups, and the control of adverse selection. Public health insur-
ance programs only cover the elderly, permanently disabled, and low-income parents, but
most other groups of adults, in particular, low income childless adults, are not eligible for
public coverage. As such, adults who are not covered through public or employment-based
insurance have difficulty purchasing a health insurance through non-group market, one rea-
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son for this is that the market is suffering from serious adverse selection. As a result, the
Medicaid expansions have a direct effect on the labor market. Moreover, previous studies
have documented that race/ethnicity and fertility have an intricate effect on the life-time
labor supply (Troske and Voicu, 2011). Thus, this paper investigates whether the effect of
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansion on the labor supply of low-income
childless adults is different for different races.
As of January 1, 2014, the ACA has expanded Medicaid to all adults with an income
level at or below 138% of Federal Poverty Level (FPL) in 26 states. This expansion not only
increased eligibility for parents, but also ended the historic exclusion of childless adults
from Medicaid. This paper will explore the effects of this Medicaid expansion on the labor
supply for adults without dependent children. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS)
Basic Monthly Data, I find new evidence that the Medicaid reform has had different effects
on the labor supply for different races. My results suggest that the phased-in Medicaid
expansions decreased the probability of participating in the labor force by 2.90 percentage
points among white married adults and increased the labor supply of never-married black
adults by 5.41 percentage points. However, the Medicaid expansion does not play a large
role for other groups of black and white adults.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Medicaid
program and the particular reforms used to identify Medicaid’s effect. Section 3 discusses
the previous literature. Section 4 shows the theoretical effects of Medicaid for childless
adults. Section 5 describes the data extraction and sources used in my analysis. Section 6
provides reduced-form evidence of Medicaid’s impact on labor force participation. Section
7 concludes.
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3.2 The National Health Care Reform
On March 23, 2010, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA,
PL 111-148) was signed into law by President Obama. This law was intended to reform
the US health care system, control health care costs and extend health coverage to unin-
sured adults across the country (Bhole and Curto, 2016). Starting January 1, 2014, the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) expanded Medicaid eligibility to nearly all adults with family
income at or below 138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) ($15,856 for an individual,
$26,951 for a family of 3 in 2014) (KFF State Health Facts, 2013). This Medicaid ex-
pansion vastly increased eligibility in many states for low-income parents and other adults
without dependent children.
Although the Medicaid expansion was designed to be implemented in the entire
country, individual states could choose whether or not to participate. As of January 1,
2014, there were 25 states and Washington D.C. that planned to move forward with the
Medicaid expansion in the first place (KFF State Health Facts, 2013). As of January 1,
2016, a total of 30 states and Washington D.C. had adopted the Medicaid expansion (KFF
State Health Facts, 2018).
In the states that expanded Medicaid, many low-income childless adults and parents
become eligible for coverage for the first time. In the 25 states and Washington D.C.that
first adopted the expansion, the median eligibility threshold increased from 0% to 138%
FPL for childless adults and from 106% FPL to 138% FPL for parents. However, there is a
wide range of variation in the threshold change across states.
In 21 of the 25 states that did not move forward with the expansion, Medicaid only
covers those parents up to 100% FPL, and almost all 25 states provide no coverage for
childless adults, regardless of income level.
Table I illustrates the Medicaid eligibility thresholds for childless adults by state for
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the years 2011 through 2015. All eligibility thresholds are calculated as the percent of the
Federal Poverty Level (FPL). The threshold data are based on a national survey conducted
by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured with the Georgetown University
Center for Children and Families.
3.3 Literature Review
In theory, the aim of Medicaid expansion was to expand health insurance coverage
for families and individuals with low income and limited resources. However, the income-
based eligibility criteria of Medicaid could have unintentional impacts on the labor supply
of enrollees. The impacts of Medicaid expansion on the work effort can be broadly divided
into three categories (Kaestner et al., 2015). First, people who lack employment-based
health insurance and earn an annual income just higher than Medicaid eligibility threshold
may decrease work effort or quit the job in order to lower income and become eligible for
Medicaid. Second, some people newly eligible for Medicaid may reduce work effort or
quit the job because Medicaid coverage directly reduces out-of-pocket medical expenses
and eliminates the premium of health insurance, which allows individuals to work less
but gain the same amount of consumption as before. Third, some people who are already
eligible for Medicaid before expansion may increase work effort or look for a new job
because the newly expanded eligibility threshold allows individuals work more and get a
higher income than before and still remain eligible for Medicaid. Therefore, the Medicaid
expansions may have either a positive or negative effect on the labor supply for different
groups of people.
A number of researchers have explored the relationship between health insurance
eligibility and labor supply, but most of them found a weak relationship. Moffitt and Wolfe
(1990) examine the labor supply behavior after changes in Medicaid eligibility. They con-
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clude that increasing the expected benefits of Medicaid would reduce the Labor Force Par-
ticipation (LFP) rate of single mothers. Similarly, Yelowitz (1995) estimates the effect of
Medicaid earnings eligibility limits on labor supply and finds a small increase in the proba-
bility of labor force participation and a decrease in the participation of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) among divorced and separated women caused by expansions
in Medicaid eligibility for children. Recently, Congressional Budget Office (2014) con-
cludes that the ACA Medicaid expansion would reduce 1.7 percent of total work hours or
2 million full-time workers in the labor market, which is a relatively small negative effect
on labor supply. Although those authors have found a weak effect of health insurance eli-
gibility on labor supply, they also state that new sources of variation in Medicaid eligibility
might provide a better way to estimate the relationship between public health insurance
eligibility and labor supply.
Earlier studies investigating the relationship were mainly based on the effect of
“Medicaid notch” in enrollees’ budget sets, which means previous Medicaid enrollees
would lose their coverage completely once their income exceeds the particular threshold.
For instance, Dave et al. (2013) estimate the labor supply impact of Medicaid eligibility
expansions for pregnant women in the 1980s and 1990s. These authors report that gaining
Medicaid coverage is associated with a decrease in the employment of women who just
gave birth within one year.
There are few studies that focus on the effect of expanding Medicaid to childless
adults, and the conclusions of these studies are mixed. Baicker et al. (2013) use an ex-
perimental research design to estimate the impacts of the Oregon Medicaid expansion on
adults without dependent children in 2008, and find that there is a 3 percent statistically
insignificant change in labor supply and incomes after Medicaid expansion. Another inno-
vative research design used by Dague et al. (2014) investigate the expansion of Medicaid in
Wisconsin to childless adults in 2009. They find that the expansion of Medicaid enrollment
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decreases employment by a range from 2 to 18 percent. Moreover, Garthwaite et al. (2013)
use a difference-in-difference approach to examine the Tennessee rollback of the Medicaid
eligibility threshold in 2005. The authors report that the change in Medicaid eligibility
increases the labor supply by 25 percent among low-educated adults without dependent
children, but they do not find other statistically significant effects among other educational
classes.
The question of potential racial differences in labor supply has been studied for
decades, but few studies focus on the effect of Medicaid expansion on the labor supply
for different racial groups. Troske and Voicu (2011) report that race/ethnicity, education
level and fertility all have statistically significant impacts on the female’s labor supply.
Specifically, the negative effects of children are larger for white females than for other
racial females. Pabilonia and Ward-Batts (n.d.) find different effects on a male’s labor
supply for different racial groups depending on the sex of his child. The results show that
immigrants work more weeks and hours per year if they have a daughter than a son.
In this paper, I use recent data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to in-
vestigate whether the effect of the latest Medicaid reform on labor force participation for
low-income childless adults, who generally are not eligible for Medicaid coverage before
this expansion, is different between blacks and whites. Moreover, I will take job search
theory, the income effect and the permanent income hypothesis as potential explanations of
the effect. My hypothesis is for there to be, in general, a negative impact from the Medicaid
threshold on labor supply.
3.4 Theoretical Effects of Medicaid
To analyse the effect of Medicaid expansion on the labor supply of childless adults,
I use a traditional kind of the static labor supply model. Assume that each adult maximizes
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their utility, U = u(Consumption, Leisure). The budget constraint is linear and the slope
is a constant after-tax wage, w. At zero hours of work, adults cannot receive any level of
benefits, since there are few subsidies and assistance for childless adults.
Figure 1 shows the change in the optimal point of the consumption-leisure trade off
for childless adults after Medicaid expansion. Before the expansion, adults choose a Hb
and Cb to maximize their utility. He and Ce is the optimal point after the expansion. Since
states have expanded eligibility for Medicaid by increasing the income limit, the budget
constraint under the income eligible threshold shifts outward, and hence childless adults
are able to choose a higher level of leisure and consumption for the same level of after-
tax wage. This illustrates that Medicaid expansion decreases labor supply and increases
consumption for childless adults.
3.5 Data
The dataset for this analysis derives from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
Basic Monthly Data, from the January 2011 to December 2015. This time period covers
the time-frame of the Medicaid expansion. The CPS is a monthly, nationally representative
survey of approximately 50,000 households and it is the primary data set which includes
retrospective information on labor force participation and welfare participation of the US
civilian, non-institutionalized population in the U.S.. Table II provides descriptive statistics
for all of my sample. The sample contains 473,365 adults between the age of 20 and 55.
I exclude those with children in their family, since this paper investigates the effect of
Medicaid expansion on the low-income childless adults who become newly eligible for
coverage. I further limit my sample to adults whose family incomes were below 150%
of the FPL (Federal Poverty level) when I first observe them in the data, since this range
of adults is most likely to be affected by Medicaid expansion. Table III and Table IV
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provide descriptive statistics for childless white and black adults respectively. The labor
force participation rate of all groups of whites are relatively higher than blacks except for
married females. Approximately 52.1% of white married female are employed at the time
of the interview, compared to approximately 53.7% of black married females. While these
rates are relatively low, one should keep in mind that married women are less likely to
enter the labor force than other demographic groups. The mean age are very similar for
whites and blacks in each group. Moreover, whites, on average, receive more education
than blacks.
Previous studies on labor force participation often focus on the entire population,
since they assume that the Medicaid expansions affect the labor supply decisions of whites
and blacks similarly. However, I expect the Medicaid expansion would have different ef-
fects on the labor supply for different races, gender, and marital status. Therefore, I choose
a more flexible approach which divides the sample of adults into married male, never-
married male, married female, never-married female, all married, and all never-married
for blacks and whites separately. These detailed estimates will help us better understand
whether marital status and gender have different impacts on the labor supply between white
and black people.
In this paper, I use the CPS data to estimate a model of labor force participation
rate, and suppose that varying the Medicaid eligible threshold could change the reserva-
tion threshold for an adult leaving the labor force. Even though I am not able to observe
these reservation thresholds, I can estimate the variations in labor force participation in the
aggregate which might be affected by the Medicaid expansion.
To estimate the effect of the Medicaid expansion on labor supply, I use a linear
probability model. The model is specified as:
LFPist = β0 + β1Mist + β2Xist + ρs + τt + ρs ∗ t+ ist (3.1)
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where i indexes adults, s indexes states, and t indexes time. The dependent variable,
LFPist, is a dummy variable representing Labor Force Participation (LFP), which equals
one if adult i living in state s stayed in the labor force (employed & unemployed) at time t,
and zero otherwise. Xist is a vector of adult demographics (including race, age, education,
and age-education interaction term). The variable ρs is a set of state fixed effects, τt is a set
of month and year fixed effects, and ρs ∗ t is a set of state-specific linear time-trends.
The key variable is the Medicaid threshold variable, Mist, which is defined as the
monthly Medicaid eligibility threshold for adult i in state s at month t, and this threshold is
assigned based on household size. Aizer and Grogger (2003) denote the Medicaid eligible
threshold as a binary "Medicaid expansions" indicator, which equals one if the threshold
expanded after Medicaid policy changes, and zero otherwise. This method is reasonable
when studying the change in expansion size, and it can represent multiple expansions in
the model easily. However, unlike their work, I code the eligible threshold as the per-
cent of the FPL, since I attempt to answer a more specific question, "How does the labor
force participation rate change in response to one percentage point change in the Medicaid
threshold?"
The within-and-across states Medicaid expansions allow me to distinguish the ef-
fects of variation in Medicaid eligible thresholds from other more general effects of adults
living in a specific state at a specific time. In my model, I adopt state fixed effects to con-
trol for all time independent differences across states, time fixed effects to account for the
national monthly time trends and seasonal effects, and the ρs ∗ t term to refer to particular
state specific linear time trends (by month). The adoption of these fixed effects allows me
to identify the effect of Medicaid eligible threshold expansion on labor supply decisions.
Moreover, the Medicaid expansion is clearly targeted at all adults with incomes below
138% of the federal poverty level. Even though approximately half of the states have not
expanded Medicaid, I treat the Medicaid expansion as exogenous.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Estimates of the Effect of Medicaid Expansions on Labor Supply-
White
Table V summarizes the linear probability model regression results about the effect
of the ACA Medicaid expansions on the labor supply for whites. The measures of labor
supply are examined by labor force participation rate. The result indicates that white fe-
males are more likely to leave the labor force than white males (omitted), irrespective of
marital status. Since there are age and education interaction terms in the model, the age
dummies show that higher ages mainly have a negative effect on the labor supply for white
males with an education level less than high school (omitted), and education dummies re-
port that high school and college education are principally associated with a higher labor
supply for whites with age between 20 to 25 (omitted): e.g., the labor force participation
rate of white married adults with a high school education is 7.61 percentage points higher
than high school dropout (omitted) on average with an age between 20 and 25. This result
is consistent with the expectation that more-educated adults are more productive and that
higher wages induce them to enter the labor force.
The Medicaid threshold has a strong explanatory power for the labor force par-
ticipation of all white married childless adults, especially white married females. Since
the negative effect of the 2014 medicaid expansion on all married white adults is statis-
tically significant at the 5% significance level and on married white females at the 10%
significance level. However, the expansions have no effect on the labor supply of childless
never-married white adults. Moreover, the coefficients for the sample of married adults are
consistent with expectation. These estimates indicate that white married adults are more
likely to leave the labor force in the presence of a higher Medicaid threshold. There are a
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few potential reasons for this negative effect. First, if health insurance is relatively impor-
tant compared to other job attributes such that it induces some adults to work, the public
coverage expansion could reduce the incentive to work for those adults. Second, eligibility
for public coverage virtually eliminates out-of-pocket medical expenses and premiums of
health insurance (which is similar to an increase in total income), an outward movement
of the budget constraint stimulates adults to consume more, leisure more and work less.
In other words, adults will leave the labor force when the Medicaid threshold is greater or
equal to the reservation threshold. Third, some adults without employment-based health
insurance who have an annual income just higher than the new Medicaid eligibility thresh-
old may decrease work effort or quit the job in order to lower income and become eligible
for Medicaid. Conversely, the result also shows that the Medicaid expansion has a small
positive (but statistically insignificant) effect on never-married white adults.
Even though the estimates for never-married white females and all white males are
relatively small and statistically insignificant, the estimates indicate that the labor force par-
ticipation rate for white married males decrease by 0.02 percentage points as the medicaid
threshold increases one percentage point. The overall increase in the Medicaid thresh-
old for childless adults is 138 percentage points after the Medicaid expansion, so this
change in the threshold would decrease in the probability of labor force participation rate
by 0.02 ∗ 138 = 2.76 percentage points on average for white married males, which is a
more than 5% decrease relative to the average labor force participation rate. Similarly, the
overall change in the labor force participation rate for white married females, white never-
married females, white never-married males, all white married, and all white never-married
are−2.64, 0.51, 1.63,−2.90 and 1.28 percentage points, respectively. The estimation result
of the effect of the Medicaid expansion for whites only shows that childless white married
adults have experienced a meaningful reduction in labor supply, but Medicaid expansion
does not play a large role for never-married white males and females without children.
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3.6.2 Estimates of the Effect of Medicaid Expansions on Labor Supply-
Black
I also examine the effect of Medicaid expansions on the labor supply for blacks only.
Table VI presents linear probability model estimates. The dummy variable for sex indicates
that the labor force participation rate of black married females is 5.37 percentage points
lower than black married males (omitted), but there is no significant difference between
never-married black females and males. The age dummies report that higher ages only have
significant negative effects on the labor supply for blacks who are older than 40 year-old
who received less than a high school educational level (omitted). Moreover, educational
dummies report that more educated blacks with an age between 20 and 25 (omitted) are
generally associated with higher labor force participation rate, similar to whites.
Estimates of the Medicaid eligible threshold are all positive for blacks, but only two
are statistically significant. Among them, there is a statistically significant (at the 10% sig-
nificant level) positive effect on all never-married black adults and a statistically significant
(at the 5% significant level) positive effect on never-married black males. The threshold
variables indicate that the ACA Medicaid expansions are associated with a remarkable in-
crease in labor supply for never-married black childless adults, particularly never-married
males. This result may be explained by any one or more of the following reasons. First, the
Medicaid coverage expansion improves physical or mental health for some young adults,
making them more likely to work. Second, employers may offer more jobs or higher wages
in the labor market, since they no longer need to offer employment-based health insurance
for workers. Third, since black adults have relatively lower lifetime income on average
than whites, the 2014 Medicaid expansion becomes a relatively higher jump in their in-
come, inducing those young black people to look for a job directly after high school or
drop out from college to work. Lastly, Medicaid expansion may reduce the crime rate of
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black young males and thus increase their labor supply. In contrast to married white adults,
married black adults are shown to have no large response to the Medicaid expansion in their
labor supply decision.
Likewise, the overall change in the labor force participation rate associated with the
ACA Medicaid expansion for black married females, black never-married females, black
married male, black never-married males, all black married, and all black never-married
are 1.39, ,3.22, 2.57, 7.29, 1.97 and 5.41 percentage points, respectively. The estimates
of the effect of the Medicaid expansions on the labor supply of blacks show that childless
black married adults show indifference to the Medicaid expansion; on the other hand, the
increase in Medicaid eligibility thresholds provides an incentive to increase labor supply
among never-married black adults without dependent children.
3.6.3 Potential Problem of the Estimation
There are a few potential reasons for the relatively small impact on the labor supply
from the Medicaid expansions predicted by my model. First, my data focus on near-poor
adults, who are a relative small subset of the population, and this might make it difficult
to obtain precise estimates of the effect. Second, my dataset contains less than twenty-
four months of data for the period after the Medicaid expansion policy was enacted. In
this period, some newly eligible childless adults may not realize that they are now eligible
for Medicaid coverage, or they there may be a lag in their response to the policy change.
Third, the variation in the dependent variable (LFP) is relatively small, creating a potential
problem in estimating the effect of the expansions.
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3.7 Conclusion
With the passage of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act(PPACA), some
states expanded their health coverage to previously uninsured parents and childless adults.
Using the ACA Medicaid health insurance expansion for childless adults, I investigate
whether the spillover effect of the latest Medicaid reform on labor force participation for
near-poor childless adults is different between blacks and whites. I show that the effect
of Medicaid coverage on the labor supply is different between black and white childless
adults. For whites, the Medicaid eligibility reduces the probability of labor force partici-
pation rate by 2.90 percentage points for all white childless married adults, and it does not
play a large role for white childless never-married adults. The estimates of blacks are the
opposite of whites; the Medicaid expansions are associated with a 5.41 percentage points
increase in labor supply among never-married, low-income, childless black adults, and
with a 7.29 percentage points for never-married black males without children in particular.
There is little evidence that the Medicaid expansions impacted the labor supply of all mar-
ried black childless adults. These results suggest that the recent law change has different
influences on the labor supply for blacks and whites. The reasons for different responses
in labor supply are mainly based on different lifetime income distributions and crime rates
between blacks and whites, which will be investigated in my next paper.
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Table 3.1: Medicaid eligibility thresholds for childless adults by state, 2011-2015
State Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona 110 110 100 138 138
Arkansas 0 0 0 138 138
California 0 0 0 138 138
Colorado 0 0 20 138 138
Connecticut 73 72 70 138 138
Delaware 110 110 110 138 138
District of Columbia 211 211 211 215 215
Florida 0 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii 100 100 100 138 138
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0
Illinois 0 0 0 138 138
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0
Iowa 0 0 0 138 138
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 0 0 138 138
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0
Maine 0 0 0 0 0
Maryland 0 0 0 138 138
Massachusetts 0 0 0 138 138
Michigan 0 0 0 138 138
Minnesota 0 75 75 205 138
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0
Montana 0 0 0 0 0
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 138 138
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 138
New Jersey 0 0 0 138 138
New Mexico 0 0 0 138 138
New York 100 100 100 138 138
North Carolina 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 0 138 138
Ohio 0 0 0 138 138
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 138 138
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 138
Rhode Island 0 0 0 138 138
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0
Texas 0 0 0 0 0
Utah 0 0 0 0 0
Vermont 160 150 160 138 138
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0
Washington 0 0 0 138 138
West Virginia 0 0 0 138 138
Wisconsin 0 0 0 100 100
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0
Note:Reflects income eligibility limits for coverage that provides full Medicaid
benefits. Eligibility limits for waiver programs that provide more limited benefits
or for fully state-funded programs are not included. Sources: Based on a national
survey conducted by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
with the Georgetown University Center for Children and Families, 2011-2016.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Married Female Married Male Never-married Female Never-married Male
LFP 52.49 65.89 61.26 65.20
(49.94) (47.41) (48.72) (47.63)
Age 44.91 43.679 30.6 31.034
(9.32) (9.52) (10.86) (10.42)
White 0.841 0.855 0.744 0.787
(753.84) (736.35) (572.50) (769.97)
Black 0.159 0.145 0.256 0.213
(142.79) (125.16) (197.42) (208.49)
Less than high school 0.219 0.257 0.137 0.196
(173.68) (178.63) (133.69) (197.64)
High school 0.574 0.581 0.622 0.641
(380.72) (357.55) (431.00) (535.58)
College degree 0.182 0.14 0.213 0.145
(154.74) (122.44) (174.77) (165.09)
Graduate school 0.025 0.022 0.029 0.018
(52.84) (45.35) (58.08) (54.23)
Sample Size 107,641 92,165 113,024 160,535
Note: Data from the January 2011 to December 2015 Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly
files. Sample is limited to childless adults between ages 20-55 with family incomes were below 150%
of the FPL (Federal Poverty level).
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for whites
Married Female Married Male Never-married Female Never-married Male
LFP 51.76 66.35 63.33 68.37
(49.97) (47.25) (48.19) (46.50)
Age 44.711 43.528 29.396 30.64
(9.45) (9.60) (10.23) (10.24)
Less than high school 0.221 0.265 0.123 0.188
(160.09) (168.64) (108.47) (171.22)
High school 0.568 0.568 0.609 0.633
(344.60) (321.93) (362.13) (466.33)
College degree 0.186 0.144 0.236 0.16
(143.64) (115.01) (160.94) (155.01)
Graduate school 0.026 0.023 0.032 0.019
(49.29) (42.87) (52.86) (49.85)
Sample Size 90,499 78,775 84,043 126,328
Note: Data from the January 2011 to December 2015 Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly
files. Sample is limited to childless white adults between ages 20-55 with family incomes were below
150% of the FPL (Federal Poverty level).
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for blacks
Married Female Married Male Never-married Female Never-married Male
LFP 54.16 60.48 58.60 58.58
(49.83) (48.89) (49.26) (49.26)
Age 45.957 44.564 34.09 32.489
(8.57) (8.96) (11.85) (10.94)
Less than high school 0.209 0.21 0.176 0.223
(67.39) (59.58) (78.77) (99.04)
High school 0.607 0.657 0.657 0.673
(162.83) (160.19) (235.79) (265.34)
College degree 0.162 0.117 0.147 0.091
(57.66) (42.16) (70.54) (58.50)
Graduate school 0.021 0.016 0.02 0.013
(19.07) (14.82) (24.16) (21.38)
Sample Size 17,142 13,390 28,981 34,207
Note: Data from the January 2011 to December 2015 Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly
files. Sample is limited to childless black adults between ages 20-55 with family incomes were below
150% of the FPL (Federal Poverty level).
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Table 3.5: Effect of Medicaid expansions on labor force participation rate for whites
Married female Never-married female Married male Never-married male All married All never-married
Medicaid eligible threshold (%) -0.0191* 0.00366 -0.0236 0.0118 -0.0210** 0.00926
(0.0110) (0.0118) (0.0162) (0.0102) (0.0094) (0.0082)
Female -13.96*** -5.974***
(1.1383) (0.5117)
Age dummy from 26 to 30 8.514** 3.044 -3.041 4.574*** 5.415** 5.002***
(3.3204) (3.5071) (2.8956) (1.2811) (2.6232) (1.5230)
Age dummy from 31 to 35 12.81*** -3.854 -6.631** -0.438 5.019 -0.0505
(4.4131) (4.3085) (3.1152) (2.1522) (3.2853) (2.4726)
Age dummy from 36 to 40 8.091* 2.800 -6.645*** -4.253 2.127 -1.946
(4.6767) (6.0496) (2.3481) (3.0127) (2.7294) (3.5248)
Age dummy from 41 to 45 8.769** -5.460 -14.94*** -10.32*** -4.022* -9.407***
(3.4004) (4.8860) (2.3768) (2.6887) (2.2968) (2.6376)
Age dummy from 46 to 50 5.047 -6.998 -22.14*** -23.93*** -9.127*** -18.98***
(3.9517) (4.4377) (3.7001) (2.2177) (3.2089) (2.6969)
Age dummy from 51 to 55 0.0177 -14.33*** -29.94*** -30.71*** -15.70*** -25.74***
(2.8859) (3.4723) (2.6098) (3.0450) (2.3514) (2.4855)
High school 23.31*** 18.62*** -6.506** -1.935 7.607*** 4.723***
(3.0090) (1.2580) (2.5441) (1.6658) (2.2429) (1.1751)
College degree 31.58*** 25.64*** -9.792** 2.512 11.45*** 11.04***
(3.6596) (1.4742) (4.2384) (1.9600) (2.1562) (1.5216)
Graduate school 20.45* 20.10*** -7.167 -6.424 7.541 4.577
(10.1860) (4.2625) (9.4487) (3.8569) (7.0950) (3.2828)
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age&Edu Interaction Term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 90,499 84,043 78,775 126,328 169,274 210,371
Average LFP 51.76 63.33 66.35 68.37 58.58 66.36
Note:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The omitted groups are Male, Age dummy from 20 to 25 and Less than high school. Data from 2011-2015
Current Population Survey. Estimates report the regression results for white only. Sample is limited to childless adults between ages 20-55 with family
incomes were below 150% of the FPL (Federal Poverty level). Regressions are adjusted using indicators for state, year, state-specific time trend, sex, age
dummy, education and age-education interaction term. All standard errors are clustered on state.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Medicaid expansions on labor force participation rate for blacks
Married female Never-married female Married male Never-married male All married All never-married
Medicaid eligible threshold (%) 0.0101 0.0233 0.0186 0.0528** 0.0143 0.0392*
(0.0326) (0.0348) (0.0292) (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0228)
Female -5.368*** 0.320
(1.2570) (0.7869)
Age dummy from 26 to 30 -6.555 -8.524 6.659 3.788 -0.816 -0.0261
(14.0661) (5.1677) (11.9649) (3.4126) (9.7485) (2.8923)
Age dummy from 31 to 35 -11.35 -7.456 5.847 -3.239 2.417 -4.534
(9.1794) (7.6023) (11.9741) (4.3776) (7.5522) (3.9870)
Age dummy from 36 to 40 -0.455 -4.090 -8.517 -2.408 -3.173 -2.902
(10.1027) (5.0629) (9.5725) (3.5331) (6.5763) (2.5451)
Age dummy from 41 to 45 -18.42* -12.89** -0.375 -7.724* -9.820 -10.48***
(9.4010) (5.4535) (8.5152) (4.1731) (7.5109) (3.7348)
Age dummy from 46 to 50 -22.40** -19.23*** -20.22** -15.52*** -20.95** -17.69***
(8.9498) (5.7076) (9.6585) (4.1470) (7.9594) (4.2325)
Age dummy from 51 to 55 -23.81*** -22.67*** -25.82*** -29.62*** -24.07*** -25.96***
(7.7028) (5.3892) (8.6605) (3.8698) (6.5836) (3.2341)
High school -5.852 12.29*** -4.352 12.30*** -3.780 12.22***
(9.1193) (3.1462) (9.0815) (2.5244) (6.3918) (2.1625)
College degree 0.835 19.45*** 5.220 23.51*** 2.547 20.90***
(11.4695) (3.6619) (14.1327) (3.2231) (8.5480) (2.2623)
Graduate school 26.68*** -2.183* -19.25* 7.712 27.07*** 0.253
(7.8415) (12.3776) (7.2552) (13.9288) (6.0194) (8.2870)
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age&Edu Interaction Term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,142 28,981 13,390 34,207 30,532 63,188
Average LFP 54.16 58.60 60.48 58.58 59.96 58.59
Note:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The omitted groups are Male, Age dummy from 20 to 25 and Less than high school. Data from 2011-2015
Current Population Survey. Estimates report the regression results for black only. Sample is limited to childless adults between ages 20-55 with family
incomes were below 150% of the FPL (Federal Poverty level). Regressions are adjusted using indicators for state, year, state-specific time trend, sex, age
dummy, education and age-education interaction term. All standard errors are clustered on state.
75
Figure 3.1: Budget Set for Childless Adults before and after Medicaid Expansion
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